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A Right to a Human Decision
Aziz Z. Huq*
[105 Virginia Law Review – (forthcoming May 2020)]
Abstract
Recent advances in computational technologies have spurred anxiety about a shift of power from human
to machine decision-makers. From prison sentences to loan approvals to college applications, corporate
and state actors increasingly lean on machine learning tools (a subset of artificial intelligence) to allocate
goods and to assign coercion. Machine-learning tools are perceived to be eclipsing, even extinguishing,
human agency in ways that sacrifice important individual interests. An emerging legal response to such
worries is a right to a human decision. European law has already embraced the idea in the General
Data Protection Regulation. American law, especially in the criminal justice domain, is already
moving in the same direction. But no jurisdiction has defined with precision what that right entails, or
furnished a clear justification for its creation.
This Article investigates the legal possibilities of a right to a human decision. I first define the conditions
of technological plausibility for that right as applied against state action. To understand its
technological predicates, I specify the margins along which machine decisions are distinct from human
ones. Such technological contextualization enables a nuanced exploration of why, or indeed whether,
the gaps that do separate human and machine decisions might have normative import. Based on this
technological accounting, I then analyze the normative stakes of a right to a human decision. I consider
three potential normative justifications: (a) an appeal to individual interests to participation and
reason-giving; (b) worries about the insufficiently reasoned or individuated quality of state action; and
(c) arguments based on negative externalities. A careful analysis of these three grounds suggests that
there is no general justification for adopting a right to a human decision by the state. Normative
concerns about insufficiently reasoned or accurate decisions, which have a particularly powerful hold on
the legal imagination, are best addressed in other ways. Similarly, concerns about the ways that
algorithmic tools create asymmetries of social power are not parried by a right to a human decision.
Indeed, rather than firmly supporting a right to a human decision, available evidence tentatively points
toward a countervailing ‘right to a well-calibrated machine decision’ as ultimately more normatively
well- grounded.

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Faith Laken
for terrific research aid. Thanks to Tony Casey, David Driesen, Lauryn Gouldin, Daniel Hemel, Darryl Li, Anup Malani,
Richard McAdams, Eric Posner, Julie Roin, and Lior Strahilevitz for thoughtful conversation. Workshop participants at
the University of Chicago, the University of Houston, and Syracuse University School of Law also provided thoughtful
feedback. All errors are mine.
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A Right to a Human Decision
Introduction
Every tectonic technological change—from the first grain domesticated to the first
smartphone set abuzz1—begets a new society. Among the birth pangs of a new society are novel
anxieties about how power is distributed—how it is to be gained, and how it will be lost. A spate of
sudden advances in the computational technology known as machine learning has stimulated the most
recent rush of inky public anxiety. These new technologies apply complex algorithms,2 called machinelearning instruments, to vast pools of public and government data so as to execute tasks previously
beyond mere humans’ ability.3 Corporate and state actors increasingly lean on these tools to make
“decisions that affect people’s lives and livelihoods – from loan approvals, to recruiting, legal
sentencing, and college admissions.”4
As a result, many people feel a loss of control over key life decisions.5 Machines, they fear,
resolve questions of critical importance on grounds that are beyond individuals’ ken or control.6 As a
result, individuals experience a loss of elementary human agency, and a corresponding vulnerability to
an inhuman and inhumane machine logic. For some, “the very idea” of an algorithmic system making

1 For recent treatments of these technological causes of social transformations, see JAMES C. SCOTT. AGAINST
THE GRAIN: A DEEP HISTORY OF THE EARLIEST STATES (2018), and RAVI AGRAWAL, I NDIA CONNECTED: HOW THE
SMARTPHONE IS TRANSFORMING THE WORLD’S LARGEST DEMOCRACY (2018).

An algorithm is simply a “well-defined set[s] of steps for accomplishing a certain goal.” Joshua A. Kroll et al.,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 (2017); see also THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO
ALGORITHMS 10 (2d ed. 2001) (defining an algorithm as “any well-defined computation process that takes some value, or
set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output” (emphases omitted)). The task of computing,
at its atomic level, comprises the execution of serial algorithms. MARTIN ERWIG, ONCE UPON AN ALGORITHM: HOW
STORIES EXPLAIN COMPUTING 2-4 (2017).
2

3 Machine learning is a general purpose technology that, in broad terms, encompasses “algorithms and systems
that improve their knowledge or performance with experience.” PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012); see also ETHEM ALPAYDIN, INTRODUCTION TO
MACHINE LEARNING 2 (3d ed. 2014) (defining machine learning in similar terms). For the uses of machine learning, see
Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using Big Data for Policy Problems, SCIENCE, Feb 3, 2017, at 483,
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/355/6324/483.full (noting the use of structured machine learning to solve
prediction problems). I discuss the technological scope of the project, and define relevant terms, infra at text accompanying
note 81. I will use the terms “algorithmic tools” and “machine learning” interchangeably, even though the class of
algorithms is technically much larger.
4 Kartik Hosanagar and Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, But Too Much Can Backfire, HARV. BUS.
REV., July 23, 2018; Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning
Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1149 (2017) (“[T]oday, advanced machine-learning algorithms are creating a vastly automated
society, transforming many facets of life. Many products and services, including email spam filters, medical diagnoses,
product marketing, and self-driving cars, now depend on machine-learning algorithms and their ability to deliver
astonishing forecasting power and speed.”).
5 Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 20 J. INFO. TECH.
75, 75 (2015) (describing a “new form of information capitalism [that] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a
means to produce revenue and market control”).
6 See, e.g., Rachel Courtland, The bias detectives, SCIENCE, June 2018, 357, 357 (documenting concerns among the
public about algorithmic risk scores for detecting child abuse as failing to account for an “effort to turn [a] life around”).
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an important decision on the basis of historical data seems intrinsically “unfair.”7 Machines, it is said,
want fatally for “empathy.”8 For others, machine decisions seem dangerously inscrutable,
nontransparent, and hence hazardously unpredictable.9 Worse, governments and companies wield
these tools freely to taxonomize their populations, predict individual behavior, and even manipulate
behavior and preferences in ways that give them a new advantage over the human subjects of
algorithmic classification. Even the basic terms of political choice seem compromised.10 At the same
time that machine learning is poised to change the basic terms of interaction between citizen and
government (or big tech), advances in robotics as well as machine learning appear to be about to
displace huge tranches of both blue-collar and white-collar labor markets.11 A feared future looms
characterized by massive economic dislocation, wherein people have lost control many central life
choices, and basic consumer and political preferences are no longer really one’s own.
This article is about one nascent and still inchoate legal response to these fears: the possibility
that, under certain conditions, one has a right to a human decision, rather than a decision reached by
a purely automated process (which I call a ‘machine decision’). European law has embraced the idea.
American law, especially in the criminal justice domain, is flirting with it.12 My aim in this article is to
test this burgeoning proposal, to investigate its relationship with technological possibilities, and to
ascertain whether it is a cogent response to growing distributional, political, and epistemic anxieties.
Taking seriously concerns about equity, privacy, and power raised by an algorithmic future, I aim here
to analyze whether a right to a human decision by state actors is a cogent response.
To motivate the inquiry, consider some of the anxieties unfurling already in public debate: A
nursing union, for instance, launches a campaign urging patients to demand human medical judgments
rather than technological assessment.13 And a majority of patients surveyed in a 2018 Accenture survey
flatly refused to be treated by a machine, rather than a human.14 When California replaced money bail
7

Reuben Binns et al., ‘It’s Reducing a Human Being to a Percentage’: Perceptions of Justice in Algorithmic Decisions, PROC.
377, 385 (2018).

OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON H UMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS
8

THE POOR

VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH
30 (2018).

Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV., 2017, April 11, 2017,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ (“The computers that run those
services have programmed themselves, and they have done it in ways we cannot understand. Even the engineers who build
these apps cannot fully explain their behavior.”).
9

10 See, e.g., Daniel Kreiss and Shannon C. McGregor, Technology firms shape political communication: The work of Microsoft,
Facebook, Twitter, and Google with campaigns during the 2016 US presidential cycle, 35 POL. COMM. 155, 156-57 (2018) (describing
the role of social media employees in shaping campaigns).
11 For what has become the standard view, see Larry Elliott, Robots will take our jobs. We’d better plan now, before it’s
too late, GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/01/robots-take-our-jobsamazon-go-seattle. For a more nuanced account, see MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
THREAT OF A JOBLESS FUTURE 282-83 (2017) (offering a more nuanced and conditional analysis).
12

See infra text accompanying note 81.

13 National Nurses United, When it matters most, insist on a registered nurse, May 14, 2013,
https://www.nationalnursesunited.org/insist-registered-nurse.

Accenture, Accenture 2018 Consumer Survey on Digital Health, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-new2018-consumer-survey-digitalhealth?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosvitals&stream=top-stories
14
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with a “risk-based pretrial assessment” tool, state court judges warned that “[t]echnology cannot
replace the depth of judicial knowledge, experience, and expertise in law enforcement that prosecutors
and defendants’ attorneys possess.”15 In 2018, the city of Flint, MI, discontinued the use of a highly
effective machine learning tool to identify defective water pipes, reverting under community pressure
to human decision-making with a far lower hit rate for detecting defective pipes.16 Or consider the
worry congealed in an anecdote told by data scientist Cathy O’Neill: An Arkansas women Catherine
Taylor is denied federal housing assistance because she fails an automated, “web-crawling, datagathering” background check.17 It is only when “one conscientious human being” takes the trouble to
look into the quality of this machine result that it is discovered that Taylor has been red-flagged in
error.18 O’Neill’s anecdote nicely captures the fear that machines will be unfair, incomprehensive, or
incompatible with the flexing of elementary human agency.
Varying judgments about the value of human as opposed to automated decision-making are
also apparent in the divergent approaches major aircraft manufacturers—and their regulators—take
to “artificial intelligence” autopilots for commercial airlines.19 Whereas Airbus favors heavy
automation, Boeing vests more control in human pilots20 (although perhaps not always enough?21).
American law favors the human over the machine. Autopilot functionalities that cannot be “quickly
and positively disengaged by the pilots to prevent it from interfering with their control” are prohibited
in federally regulated planes.22 In effect, the regulation fashions a narrowly gauged right to a human
pilot, at least in the last instance.
The most important formulation of a right to a human decision to date is found in European
law. In April 2016, the European Parliament enacted a new regime of data protection in the form of

15 Quentin L. Kopp, Replacing Judges with Computers is Risky, HARV. L. REV. BLOG, Feb 18, 2018,
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/replacing-judges-with-computers-is-risky/.
16 Alexis C. Madrigal, How a Feel-Good AI Story Went Wrong in Flint, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 3, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/01/how-machine-learning-found-flints-lead-pipes/578692/
17 CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 152-53 (2016).
18

OF

MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY

AND

Id. at 153.

Jack Stewart, Don’t Freak Out Over Boeing’s Self-Flying Plane—Robots Already Run the Skies, WIRED, June 9, 2017,
https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-autonomous-plane-autopilot/.
19

20

Id.

21 James Glanz et al., Why Regulators Fear the Two Boeing 737 Crashes Happened for the Same Reason, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/13/world/boeing-737-crash-investigation.html.
22 14 C.F.R. § 21.1329(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (“The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of the aircraft.”). Fatal crashes do occur as a result of automated systems’
failure. In June 2008, Air France Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 people aboard. The investigation
subsequently carried out by French aviation authorities found that the sequence of events leading to the accident included
unanticipated disconnection by the autopilot. Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, Final Report on the accident on 1st June 2009
to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro, 17 (July 2012),
https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf.
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a General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).23 Unlike the legal regime it superseded,24 the GDPR
as implemented in May 2018 is legally mandatory even in the absence of implementing legislation by
member states of the European Union (“EU”). Hence, it can be directly enforced in court through
hefty financial penalties.25 Article 22 of the GDPR endows natural individuals with “the right not to
be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing including profiling, which produces
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”26 That right covers
private and some (but not all) state entities.27 On its face, it fashions an opt-out of quite general scope
from automated to human decision-making.28
The GDPR also has extraterritorial effect. It reaches platforms such as Google and Facebook
that offer services within the EU.29 And American law is also making tentative moves toward a similar
right to a human decision. In 2016, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an
algorithmically generated risk score “may not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding
whether the offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the community” as a matter of due
process.30 That decision precludes full automation of bail determinations. There must be a human
judge in the loop. The Wisconsin Court’s holding is unlikely to prove unique. State deployment of
machine-learning has, more generally, elicited sharp complaint sounding in procedural justice and
fairness terms.31 Further, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial has to date principally been

23
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 3A32016R0679 [hereinafter “General Data Protection Regulation” or “GDPR”]; see
also Christina Tikkinen-Piri, Anna Rohunen, and Jouni Markkula, EU General Data Protection Regulation: Changes and
implications for personal data collecting companies, 34 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 134, 134-35 (2018) (documenting enactment process
of GDPR).

See Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L
281) (EC) [hereinafter “Directive 95/46”].
24

Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a “right to explanation,”
arXiv preprint 1606.08813, at 2 (2016) (explaining the difference between a nonbinding Directive and a legally binding
Regulation under European law).
25

26

GDPR §22(1).

GDPR §4(7) & (8) (defining “controller and “processor” as key scope terms). The Regulation, however, does
not apply to criminal and security investigations. See GDPR §2(d).
27

28 As I explain below, this is not the only provision of the GDPR that can be interpreted to create a right to a
human decision. See infra text accompanying notes 63 to 68.
29 There is sharp divergence in the scholarship over the GDPR’s extraterritorial scope, which ranges from the
measured, see Griffin Drake, Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of Uncertainty, 91
S. CAL. L. REV. 163, 166 (2017) (documenting new legal risks to American companies pursuant to the GDPR), to the
alarmist, see Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 65, 92 (2017) (“The GDPR is, in many senses, excessively burdensome and with sizeable extraterritorial
effects.”).
30

State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (2016).

See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the
Country to Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/6L7TELPG] (criticizing machine-learning instruments in the criminal justice context).
31
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deployed to resist judicial fact-finding.32 But there is no conceptual reason why the Sixth Amendment
could not be invoked to preclude at least some forms of algorithmically generated outcomes in the
criminal sentencing context. Indeed, it would seem to follow a fortiori that a right that precludes a
jury’s substitution with a judge would also block its displacement by a mere machine.
These are just tips of the iceberg. We are in the early days yet so far as machine learning’s
spread goes. The first truly functional “deep learning” instruments, capable of complex visual and
textual pattern recognition, were tested successfully only a decade ago.33 Many more human
capabilities will prove redundant over time.34 The impact of potential displacements is likely to be
“profound.”35 In 2016, for instance, a team of researchers at University College, London, developed
a machine-learning tool to predict decisions of the European Court of Justice with a success rate of
79 percent.36 The time of machine judges is not yet upon us. But it awaits at the horizon.37 So even if
the right to a human decision seems fanciful today, the day will soon come when it seems the sole
riposte to an irremediable technological sea change. So the time is ripe to ask what, exactly, it means.
In this Article, I first situate a right to a human decision first in a contemporary technological
context. I can thereby specify with precision the margins along which machine decisions are distinct
from human ones. My focus is on a group of related technologies known as machine learning. This is

32 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (explaining that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
“indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995))).

Jürgen Schmidhuber, Deep learning in neural networks: An overview, 61 NEURAL NETWORKS 85, 96-97 (2015);
Yoshua Bengio, Machines Who Learn, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 2016, at 46, 48 (noting that deep learning “came into its
own” in 2005). For an account of deep learning, see Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 SCIENCE 436, 437 (2015)
(describing deep learning in terms of its use of stochastic gradient ascent to improve predictive quality continuously); see
also infra text accompanying note 116.
33

34 Yet it is easy to overstate the magnitude of likely short-term changes, and miss more consequential long-term
dynamics, see Rodney Brooks, The Seven Deadly Sins of AI Prediction, MIT TECH. REV., Oct 6, 2017,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609048/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-ai-predictions/.
35 See Erik Brynjolfsson and Tom Mitchell, What can machine learning do? Workforce implications, 358 SCIENCE 1530,
1530-31 (2017) (predicting “an even larger and more rapid transformation [in labor markets] due to recent advances in
machine learning”). The number of companies using machine learning of various sorts has grown extremely rapidly in the
past three to four years. Andrew Nusca, The Current State of Artificial Intelligence, According to Nvidia's CEO, FORTUNE, Mar.
22, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/22/artificial-intelligence-nvidia/.
36 Nikolaos Aletras, Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis, Daniel Preoţiuc-Pietro & Vasileios Lampos, Predicting judicial decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights: A natural language processing perspective, 2 PEER J. COMP. SCI. e93 (2016); see also Chris
Johnston, Artificial intelligence judge developed by UCL scientists, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/24/artificial-intelligence-judge-university-college-londoncomputer-scientists#https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/24/artificial-intelligence-judge-universitycollege-london-computer-sci (“We don’t see AI replacing judges or lawyers, but we think they’d find it useful for rapidly
identifying patterns in cases that lead to certain outcomes.” (quoting creator of algorithm)).
37 Sean Braswell, All Rise for Chief Justice Robot!, OZY (June 7, 2015), http://www.ozy.com/immodest-proposal/allrise-for-chief-justice-robot/41131; Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1142 (2019) (developing the
idea of “creating an AI judge that we can use for legal decisions”). For a nuanced discussion of the possibility that
“machine-learning-based decisions” as administrative adjudicators, see Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 4, at 1186-91. For a
cogent argument against these ideas, see Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1277
(2018).
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the form of artificial intelligence diffusing most rapidly today.38 A right to a human decision cannot
be defined or evaluated without understanding the technical differences between human decisionmaking and decisions reached by these machine learning technologies. Indeed, careful analysis of how
machine learning is designed and implemented reveals that the idea of a right to a human decision is
not straightforward in practice. Nor can it be justified on certain grounds given present technological
constraints. Some common complaints about machine decisions’ opacity and autonomy, I show, are
compromised or thwarted by technical facts. Claims about a right to human input, I suggest, are better
understood to turn on the timing, and not the sheer fact, of such involvement.
With this technical foundation in hand, I analyze the right to a human decision in relation to
the normative ends it might plausibly be understood to further. I analyze three slightly different
justifications. My first line of analysis takes up the interests of an individual exposed to a machine
decision. The most pertinent of these hinge upon an individual’s participation in decision-making and
her opportunity to offer reasons. A second analytic salient tracks ways that a machine instrument
might be intrinsically objectionable (without accounting for an individual legal right). I focus here on
worries about the absence of individualized consideration and a machine’s failure to offer reasoned
judgments. Finally, I consider dynamic, system-level effects in the form of negative spillover, in
particular in relation to social power. None of these kinds of lines of argument in the end provides
sure ground for a legal right to a human decision. Rather, I offer the (so far seemingly counterintuitive) possibility of a right to a well-calibrated machine decision. That is, machine decisions are often
capable of classification with a smaller number of false positives and false negatives than humans, and
have the potential to act with fewer distorting biases. But, as critics fairly observe, theory is not
practice. Many of the instruments implemented by government tend to be highly flawed.39 A right to
a well-calibrated machine decision, and not a reversion to equally flawed human decision-making, as
plausible and as powerful in normative terms as its more familiar antonym. This conclusion, to be
clear, is emphatically not a repudiation of the distributional, political, and normative objections raised
against machine learning’s spread. I rather hope to show why a right to a human decision is not a
fitting response. By clarifying its tight normative bounds, I hope to head-off legal investments in an
inapt idea before it becomes irrevocably embedded in the law.
My analysis here focuses on how such a right might apply to state action, and not private
action for three reasons. First, salient U.S. legal frameworks, unlike the GDPR’s coverage, are largely
(although not exclusively) trained on state action. Accordingly, a focus on state action makes sense in
terms of explaining and evaluating the current U.S. regulatory landscape. Second, whereas the range
of private uses of algorithmic tools is vast and heterogenous, the public uses of algorithmic tools are
to date more homogenous. This makes them a more straightforward object of analysis. Algorithms
are now deployed in a far broader array of private activities. These range from Google’s PageRank

See infra text accompanying note 95 (defining machine learning). I am not alone in this focus. Legal scholars
are paying increasing attention to new algorithmic technologies. For leading examples, see Kroll et al., supra note 2; Michael
L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 929 (2016)
(developing a “framework” for integrating machine-learning technologies into Fourth Amendment analysis); Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 383-84 (2015) (similar); Kate Crawford
& Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109
(2014) (arguing for “procedural data due process [to] regulate the fairness of Big Data’s analytical processes with regard to
how they use personal data (or metadata …)”).
38

39

AI Now, AI Now Report 2018, at 18-22 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/reports.html.
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algorithm,40 to “fintech” used to generate new revenue streams,41 to medical instruments used to
calculate stroke risk,42 to engineers’ identification of new stable inorganic compounds.43 Algorithmic
tools are also embedded within new applications such as voice recognition software, translation
software, and visual recognition systems.44 In contrast, the state is to date an unimaginative user of
machine learning. Criminal justice appears to be a leading adaptor.45 Other regulatory domains so far
lag behind. In a handful of states, welfare bureaucracies have started to employ algorithmic tools to
sort between recipients.46 The same is true at the federal level. The Environmental Protection Agency,
for instance, uses machine learning to evaluate the effects of some toxins.47 The Internal Revenue
Service uses a machine-learning instrument to predict fraud and abuse.48 Because these adoptions seem
to be the exception rather than the rule, state uses of machine learning provide a sharper target of
inquiry. Third, where the state does use algorithmic tools, it often results in deprivations of liberty, the
freedom of movement, bodily integrity, or basic income. Accordingly, these machine decision present
arguably the most compelling circumstances for adopting a right to a human decision. By focusing the
inquiry where a right to a human decision is prima facie most compelling, I can most effectively stress
test arguments for and against that right.
The Article proceeds in three steps. Part I catalogs ways in which law has crafted, or could
craft, a right to a human decision. This taxonomical enterprise demonstrates that such a right is far
from hypothetical or fanciful. Part II defines the class of computational tools to be considered, and
explores the manner in which such instruments are distinct from human decisions. While this Part is

40

See, e.g., David Segal, The Dirty Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011 at BU1.

41 See Falguni Desai, The Age of Artificial Intelligence in Fintech, FORBES, June 30, 2016, 10:42 PM,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/06/30/the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-in-fintech
[https://perma.cc/EK89-DD3Y] (describing how fintech firms use artificial intelligence to improve investment strategies
and analyze consumer financial activity).
42 See, e.g., Benjamin Letham, Cynthia Rudin, Tyler H. McCormick, & David Madigan, Interpretable classifiers using
rules and Bayesian analysis: Building a better stroke prediction model, 9 ANNALS APP. STAT. 1350 (2015).
43 See, e.g., Paul Raccuglia et al., Machine-learning-assisted materials discovery using failed experiments, 533 NATURE 73
(2016) (identifying new vanadium compounds).
44

LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 438.

45 See Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L. J. 1043 (2019) (collecting examples); see
also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1109, 1122-44 (2017) (providing a careful
catalogue of predictive policing tools). Such usages are now extending into the immigration domain. Spencer Woodman,
Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump's Deportation Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 1:18 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-provides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/
(reporting that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) awarded a private contractor a $41 million contract to
build an “Investigative Case Management” system to allow DHS to “access a vast ‘ecosystem’ of data to facilitate
immigration officials in both discovering targets and then creating and administering cases against them”).
46

See EUBANKS, supra note 8, at 14-38.

See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, ToxCast Fact Sheet (2013), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201312/documents/toxcast-fact-sheet.pdf.
47

48 David DeBarr & Maury Harwood, Relational Mining for Compliance Risk, Presented at the Internal Revenue
Service Research Conference (2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf. For a similar effort in the food safety
domain, see Commissioner's Fellowship Program: Final Report Abstracts, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WorkingatFDA/FellowshipInternshipGraduateFacultyProgr/CommissionersFellows
hipProgram/ucm413253.htm.
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grounded in description, it also analyzes ways in which technological context either shapes or
forecloses certain formulations of the right. Part III then turns to the potential normative foundations
of such a right. It provides a careful taxonomy of those grounds. It then shows why they all fall short.
Finally, a brief conclusion inverts the analytic lens of the paper to consider whether a right to a wellcalibrated machine decision can be imagined, and even defended on more persuasive terms than a right to
a human decision.
I.

Legal Articulations of a Right to a Human Decision

This Part documents ways in which law creates something like a right to a human decision. I
use the term “law” here capaciously to extend beyond U.S. law to European law, and to range across
both private and public law domains, capturing the regulation of state and nonstate action. I take this
wide-angle view so as to develop an understanding of several aspects of this putative right: the reasons
for which it is articulated; the contexts in which it is applied; and the limits with which it is hedged.
That inquiry is largely descriptive. By surveying the current legal landscape, I offer a ‘proof of concept’
to the effect that a right to a human decision is not so outlandish a notion as to be dismissed out of
hand. At the same time, the opacities and limits of current law provide further evidence of the
difficulties packed into any effort to vest such a right in individuals.
A.

The European Right to a Human Decision

European law has, in some form, recognized something akin to a right to a human decision
since 1978. Although that right has to date not had much practical legal impact, the GDPR’s enactment
may generate a concrete effect. Historical antecedents to Art. 22 of the GDPR also cast some light on
the difficulties of fashioning such a right, and of discerning its justifications.
1.

Antecedents

An early antecedent of a right to a human decision is France’s 1978 law on “computing, files,
and liberties.”49 Article 2 of this law, as originally enacted, prohibited official use of automated profiling
or personality screening.50 So far as I can tell, this measure was never applied to machine learning,
which, in any case, were not in general usage at the time. Seventeen years later, the European
Parliament and Council promulgated the Data Protection Directive.51 The latter lacked independent
legal effect on individuals, but obliged European Union member states to enact conforming laws.
Article 15 of the Directive obligated member states to create a right “not to be subject to a decision
which produces legal effects … or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated
processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects.”52 Countries implemented this

Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068624&dateTexte=19781031.
49

50 “Aucune décision de justice impliquant une appréciation sur un comportement humain ne peut avoir pour
fondement un traitement automatisé d'informations donnant une définition du profil ou de la personnalité de l'intéressé.”
Id. at Art. 2. A second clause extended the same rule to administrative decisions. Id.
51

Directive 95/16.

52

Id. Art. 15(1).
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provision in various ways, at times differentiating between private and public actors.53 As with the
1978 French law, however, these measures appear to have had little effect on the ground.54 There is
also little evidence of the concerns that motivated Article 15’s inclusion in the Data Protection
Directive.55 Accordingly, its history yields scant guidance or illumination as to how to conceptualize
or justify a right to a human decision.
2.

Article 22 of the GDPR

In 2017, the European Commission declared that it was time to take “an essential step to
strengthening citizens’ fundamental rights in the digital age.”56 The result was the General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). In effect since May 2018, the GDPR is a comprehensive reworking
of European data privacy and protection rules. Unlike the earlier Directive, it acts directly on
companies and state institutions that handle covered forms of data. It also contains penalty provisions
envisaging fines running into the millions of euros.57 Its ninety-nine articles also cover a broad array
of other topics, and my discussion homes on the relevant language rather than providing a synoptic
overview.
Article 22(1) of the GDPR vests natural persons with a “right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”58 According to the European Commission
Data Protection Working Party created by the European Union, Article 22(1) applies only if “there is
no human involvement in the decision process.”59 In some tension with that formulation, the Working
Party guidance document also suggests that only “meaningful” and “ex post” review of an automated

53 See, e.g., Decreto legislative 30 giugno 2003, no, 196: Codce in Materia du Protezine dei Dati Personali,
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/03196dl.htm (distinguishing public actors, and imposing an absolute
prohibition on them, but creating a right to object to automated decisions by private actors).
54 See Lee Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC data protection directive and automated profiling, 17 COMP. L.
& SEC. REV. 17, 21 (2001) (describing the right as a “house of cards”). Only one German decision seems to have touched
on this right. See Isak Mendoz & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right not to be Subject to Automated Decisions based on Profiling, in EU
INTERNET LAW 11 n.36 (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds. 2017) (describing a German decision that found that creditscoring systems fall outside the scope of Article 15 and implementing domestic legislation).

Bygrave asserts that the Article was motivated by “the potential for … automisation to diminish the role played
by persons in shaping important decision-making processes.” Bygrave, supra note 54, at 18. But this is a tautology, not an
explanation of why machine decisions are to be disfavored in relation to human ones.
55

56

European Commission, Questions and Answers—Data Protection Reform Package (2017),

europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1441_en.pdf

57 Jan Philipp Albrecht, How the GDPR will change the world, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 287, 287 (2016) (describing
the sanctions regime).
58

GDPR Art. 22(1).

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the
purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 20 (Feb. 6, 2018), https://iapp.org/resources/article/wp29-draft-guidelines-onautomated-individual-decision-making-and-profiling/ [hereinafter “Working Party Guidelines”].
59
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decision would remove it from the scope of Article 22(1).60 The GDPR, though, does not explain how
the quality of such review is to be assessed.61 The precise range of automated machine-learning tools
captured by the prohibition remains up for grabs. Article 22(2) goes on from this to exclude processing
“necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract”; otherwise authorized by “Union or
Member State law”; or “based on the data subject’s explicit consent.”62 To date, there does not appear
to be any European state that has enacted an exception under Article 22(2). The scope of that
exception, therefore, appears limited,63 whereas the extent of the other exceptions remains open to
interpretation. Depending on how the term “explicit consent” is defined, moreover, the provision
might take on either a broader or a narrower scope. It is quite possible to imagine private entities
acquiring such consent as a matter of course; whether state employers or welfare agencies could do
the same, however, is a different matter. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict the precise scope or
practical effect of Article 22(1)’s right.64
Article 22 is not the only element of the GDPR that might be glossed as a right against
processing. Article 18 allows natural persons to “obtain restrictions” on unlawful or inaccurate data
processing,65 while Article 21’s “right to object” mandates that an entity “no longer process” a person’s
data once “compelling legitimate grounds” have been invoked.66 Given the broad definitions of
“processing”67 and “profiling,”68 these other provisions might sweep widely indeed. Again, the absence
of implementation by national governments or enforcement actions lodged either by private, national,

60 Id. (excluding from Article 22(1) instances in which a human “reviews and takes account of other factors in
making a final decision”).
61 It is not clear what “meaningful” supervision entails. See Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, Clarity, surprises, and
further questions in the Article 29 Working Party draft guidance on automated decision-making and profiling, 34 COMP. L. & SEC. REV.
398, 401(2018) (“How this expanded notion of ‘solely’ could practically be assessed from the point of view of the data
controller or the data subject is one of the significant grey areas th[e] guidance leaves in its wake.”). In addition, if an
automated process does not change “legal rights” or have an “equivalent or similarly significant” effect, the Working Party
suggests that it is not covered by Article 22(1). Working Party Guidelines, supra note 59, at 21-22 (noting that while
targeted advertising is not typically covered, the “intrusiveness” of the targeting, an individual’s expectations, and the
operator’s knowledge of the “vulnerabilities” of the person might render it covered by Article 22(1)).
62

GDPR Art 22(2).

63

The GDPR also defines consent in very narrow and demanding terms.

64 The antecedent to the GDPR, the first Data Protection Directive, was interpreted in light of the
proportionality principle employed across European public law. See Charlotte Bagger Tranberg, Proportionality and data
protection in the case law of the European Court of Justice 1 INT’L. DATA PRIVACY L. 239, 239-40 (2011) (summarizing case law).
The uncertainty over how proportionality review would be applied to the GDPR adds yet more difficulty to predicting
the law’s path.

65

GDPR Art. 18.

66

Id. Art. 21(1).

This is defined in relevant part to include “any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal
data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means.” Id. Art. 4(2).
67

This is defined to include “any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning
that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability,
behaviour, location or movements.” Id. Art. 4(4).
68
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or supranational authorities means that there remains considerable uncertainty about what any of these
provisions mean, let alone whether they are properly glossed to include a right to a human decision.
The principal element of the GDPR to attract attention so far is the potential right to an
explanation of algorithmic decisions, which is located elsewhere in the document.69 The right to a
human decision, whether anchored in Article 22(1) or elsewhere, has evinced contrastingly little
scholarly attention to date.70
B.

American Law and the Right to a Human Decision

There is no precise analog in U.S. law to the GDPR. This section adumbrates three legal
domains in which hints can be discerned. Knitting these together reveals the inchoate shadow of a
right to a human decision lurking in the interstices of federal and state law.
First, constitutional law at both the state and the federal level already creates individual rights
to forms of decision-making that are inconsistent with at least certain forms of machine-learning.
Perhaps the most prominent of these is the Constitution’s creation of various entitlements to a jury’s
decision, most prominently the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases.71 Ignoring for
present purposes the ubiquity of plea-bargaining, the Constitution’s entitlement to a jury
determination is one kind of a right to a human decision. In the original Constitution’s scheme, the
embedding of juries at critical instances in which state power was being exercised manifested a
commitment to democracy.72 The obligation of the citizen as a juror was necessarily “an active one”
that presupposed the autonomous exercise of human judgment in the face of potentially tyrannical
state power.73 If the Sixth Amendment is violated by the substitution of a judge for a body of human
citizens, it is hard to see how the pivotal decisional role in a criminal trial could be played a machine.
So the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and parallel constitutional provisions that
purportedly ensure access to a jury, likely encompasses a right to a human decision. And the use of a
machine-learning tool’s output to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond a statutory maximum would
violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury decide those facts if the facts upon which

69 There is some debate on whether the GDPR should be interpreted to create such a right. Compare Sandra
Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a right to explanation of automated decision-making does not exist in the general
data protection regulation, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017) (arguing against the inference of a right to an explanation) with
Andrew Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful information and the right to explanation, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233, 234 (2017)
(offering a “positive conception of that right”).

See Veale & Edwards, supra note 61, at 400-01 (noting ambiguities in current formulation); see also Meg Leta
Jones, The right to a human in the loop: Political constructions of computer automation and personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCIENCE 216,
224 (2017) (flagging the existence of Article 22).
70

U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes … shall be by Jury ….”); amd VI (right to “an impartial
Jury”); amd VII (right to “trial by jury” in certain civil cases); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)
(affirming the Sixth Amendment jury trial right in contradistinction to judicial fact-finding).
71

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991); see also Mark DeWolfe
Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584-85 (1939) (emphasizing the broad scope of juries’
decisional power on questions of both fact and law in the Founding Era).
72

Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification As Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 589 (2014); see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL DEMOCRACY 22-24, 68-75 (1994) (discussing the history of the development of
the jury in colonial America as a political institution).
73
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that output had been made were not themselves found by a jury.74 In addition, the Sixth Amendment
may impose a further friction (if not prohibition) on machine decisions in the form of the
Confrontation Clause.75
Second, the idea of due process might also be basis for a human rather than a machine
judgment. At its core, the idea of procedural due process is thought to entail “notice and some kind
of hearing.”76 There is some debate about the timing and the content of a hearing, at least so far as
the Constitution’s Due Process guarantee is concerned.77 But it is not hard to see how a question could
arise whether due process is supplied by a machine decision. Indeed, it is arguably difficult to make
sense of the idea of a “hearing” in the absence of a natural person who is either physically present for
verbal arguments, or who reads and evaluates written submissions.78
To date, there has not been a frontal challenges to algorithmic tools on Sixth Amendment or
due process grounds. This is perhaps because such instruments have to date been used to support
human decision-making rather than formally ousting it. But the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 2016
decision of State v. Loomis, resolved a Due Process challenge hinging on a criminal defendant’s
challenge to a sentencing algorithm’s criteria (as distinct from its very use).79 That challenge in part
rested on the defendant’s limited ability to challenge the algorithm’s terms and in part upon the kind
of data (general rather than individualized) upon which the algorithm relied to reach its
recommendation.80 The Wisconsin Court rejected the defendant’s constitutional arguments. It
reasoned that the algorithm employed only publicly available data, as well as data that a defendant has
supplied, and that the defendant could have denied or explained any information that was employed
to develop his prediction.81 The Court flagged the group-based, rather than individualized nature of
the data used to train the sentencing algorithm in that case, but refused to view it as unconstitutional
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). So-called evidence-based tools are widely used in
sentencing contexts already, albeit without rigorous direction and safeguards. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J.
57, 66 (2018) (describing the deployment of actuarial sentencing tools, often “without guidance as to the purposes for
which [they] may be used”). As a general matter, they appear to be employed to guide judges’ exercise of discretion over
sentence length within the bounds set by the Sixth Amendment. John Monahan & Jennifer Skeem, Risk Assessment in
Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANNU. REV. CLIN. PSYCH. 489, 500-01 (2016).
74

75

Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L. J. 1972, 2039-51 (2017).

76 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 330 (1993). For a class exposition of this idea, Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267
(1975) (discussing the characteristic elements of a fair hearing and assessing their relative importance).
77 Cf. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 239 (1973) (“The term ‘hearing’ in its legal context
undoubtedly has a host of meanings.”).
78 Friendly, supra note 76, at 1270 (“Although the term “hearing” has an oral connotation, I see no reason why in
some circumstances a “hearing” may not be had on written materials only.”).
79 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (2016); see also Huq, supra note 45, at -- (discussing the sentencing instrument
used in Wisconsin).

As the defendant’s expert witness Dr. David Thompson explained: “The Court does not know how the
COMPAS compares that individual's history with the population that it’s comparing them with. The Court doesn't even
know whether that population is a Wisconsin population, a New York population, a California population .... There’s all
kinds of information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re misinforming the court when we put these
graphs in front of them and let them use it for sentence.” Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756-57.
80

81

Id. at 761-62.
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given that it was just one of several inputs to the defendant’s sentence.82 Such data, the Court warned,
“may not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be supervised
safely and effectively in the community” consistent with due process.83 Moreover, the Court warned,
a machine’s prediction “may not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding whether the
offender can be supervised safely and effectively in the community” as a matter of due process.84
Finally, in April 2019, two Democratic Senators introduced a bill requiring the Federal Trade
Commission to enact regulations mandating “automated decision system impact assessments.”85 For
certain algorithms, that assessment is required “prior to implementation.”86 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) must promulgate regulations to enforce this requirement, and both the FTC and
Attorney Generals of the several states can enforce it.87 Although this does not contain an individual
right of action, this bill may allow suits against algorithms that may preclude their usage.
American law, in sum, does not create a right to a human decision in so many words. Rather,
such a right emerges as an unexpected implication of the Constitution’s protections of the jury trial
right. To the extent that American regulators follow the lead of the GDPR, the foundations for such
a right exist.
C.

The Tentative Form of a Novel Right

It is too early to conclude that a robust legal right to a human decision exists as a practical
matter in either European or American law. It would be equally premature to deny that such a right is
finding some footing in both the criminal and the civil regulator domains. Article 22(1) of the GDPR
will likely be the cynosure of such a right. Yet some version of that right has existed in national or
supranational European law since 1978, without much practical effect. Technical advances in the
capacity of machine learning, and in particular deep learning tools, since the early 2000s,88 however,
may place new strain on this status quo. New fears might spark conflict along unexpected regulatory

Id. at 765 ( “[T]he due process implications compel us to caution circuit courts that because COMPAS risk
assessment scores are based on group data, they are able to identify groups of high-risk offenders--not a particular highrisk individual.”).
82

Id. at 760. Separately, the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination may be triggered by
interviews designed to elicit information from a defendant for the purpose of assigning him or her an algorithmic
classification associated with a longer sentence. Cassie Deskus, Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations on Criminal Algorithmic
Decision-Making, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 259-66 (2018). That constitutional question is not well understood
as an adjunct to the right to a human decision, and so I leave it to one side here.
83

84

State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (2016).

See
Algorithmic
Accountability
Act,
S.
--,
§3(1)(A),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Algorithmic%20Accountability%20Act%20of%202019%20Bill%20Te
xt.pdf.
85

86

Id. §3(1)(A)(ii).

87

Id. §(a)(1) & (d).

88

See supra text accompanying notes 113 to 115.
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margins.89 The rate of ensuing legal change is hard to predict.90 Prohibitory regulation of machine
decisions is likely to undermine the business strategy of business entities that use some form of
machine learning.91 Predictably powerful lobbies favoring expansive use of data unhindered by a right
to opt out from machine learning will be powerful adversaries of privacy advocates in both legislative
and regulatory debates. At the same time, those lobbies may perceive beneficial compliance-related
economies of scale in regulation such as the GDPR and the CCPA. Rather than risk a balkanized
regulatory terrain, these interest groups might accept some kind of right to a human decision as a
lesser evil. Obviously, a rather different political economy characterizes the criminal justice space,
yielding different regulatory pathways with divergent technological equilibria.
Despite these political-economy uncertainties, some tentative conclusions can be drawn in
respect to the form and force of a right to a human decision from more recent legal developments.
Two merit emphasis here.
First, a right to a human decision can be verbally articulated in quite varied guises, from the
explicit commitment contained in GDPR Article 22(1) to the commitment to a (human) jury decision
in the Sixth Amendment. Alternatively, exposure to non-human decision-making might be minimized
by regulating the sheer volume of data-flows too, though, for example, the use of individual opt-outs
of data sharing.92 This sheer variegation in legal form means that it is unclear how a right to a human
decision (should it prove desirable) would best be formulated. The historical desuetude of earlier
iterations of the right to a human decision in European law, and the persisting ambiguities of the
GDPR’s Article 22 all hint at considerable operational difficulty in creating a legally enforceable right
of this flavor.
A second inference concerns transatlantic contrasts. American and European law appear to
be following divergent priorities in respect to the right to a human decision. In the U.S., that principle
has the most influence in criminal justice matters. By contrast, the GDPR carves out crime and security
related functions from its purview. Indeed, it concentrates on data processing conducted by nonstate
actors. Perhaps this divergence can be glossed as another instance of the European concern with
89 But not such all fears are unwarranted. See, e.g., Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, Rand Institute, How Many
Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? 2 (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html (“AI has
the potential to exacerbate emerging challenges to nuclear strategic stability by the year 2040 even with only modest rates
of technical progress.”).

90 This is obviously not because of the difficulty of predicting technological change. Cf. Jon ELSTER, EXPLAINING
TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 7-9 (1983) (defining “technical change” as the
“manufacture and modification of tools,” and discussing possibility different pathways by which such change can occur).
The right to a human decision involves a choice to refuse technological change. But there is nothing inexorable about
technological adaption and advance, and so no reason that technologies cannot be abandoned.
91 MIT Technology Review Insights, Machine Learning: The New Proving Ground for Competitive Advantage, MIT TECH.
REV., March 16, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603872/machine-learning-the-new-proving-ground-forcompetitive-advantage/ (finding in a survey of businesses, that 60 percent already employed machine learning in some
way, while only 5 percent had no interest in doing so in the future).

See, e.g., Assembly Bill No. 375, Ch. 55, “An act to add Title 1.81.5 (commencing with Section 1798.100) to
Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, relating to privacy,” June 28, 2018. It remains to be seen whether such an opt-out
from processing is effective. The inefficacy of consent-based strategies for vindicating online privacy does not bode well
for that kind of an individuated approach.
92
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“respect and personal dignity” working in contradistinction to an American concentration upon
“values of liberty.”93 But the obscurity of Article 22’s etiology in the 1978 French data protection law
and the 1994 European directive tells against confident diagnosis. Whatever its origins, the net effect
of this difference in domains is that the right to a human decision will be tested first in very different
circumstances in the two continents, perhaps leading to quite divergent legal regimes.
One commonality unites the emerging right to a human decision in its American and
European forms. In neither context have legislators or judges developed a robust theoretical account
of why the particular technologies, and the distinctive modalities of inferential reasoning they entail,
should be deemed objectionable. Nor have they said why a human decision should be preferred. Such
an account cannot be mechanically derived from an empirical account of the differences between
human and machine decisions. Nor, finally, does the GDPR (or its precursors) or the CCPA contain
a robust theoretical account of the right’s justification. In consequence, there is at present a theoretical
gap between the emergent right and an empirically and normatively persuasive justification. It is that
gap that the balance of this Article explores.
II.

The Difference Between Machine Decisions and Human Decisions

To make sense of the idea of a right to a human decision, and why it might be normatively
appealing, we need to clearly understand what kind of nonhuman (machine) decisions we are
concerned about; how they differ from human decision-making processes; and how human and
machine decisions in practice can be either distinct or entangled so as to be functionally separable or
inseparable. To that end, this Part develops a brief and nontechnical account of the relevant
technologies. It focuses in particular on a class of machine-learning tools (also sometimes called
artificial intelligence94) that hold the most immediate promise for displacing human decisions. I parse
the normative implications of these technical differences as a predicate to Part III’s more fine-grained
normative inquiry. This contextualizing account has an immediate normative payoff: It helps clarify
the conditions of technical plausibility of any right to a human decision. I suggest that right is best
understood as a demand for an ex post review of machine decisions. This Part’s account also sets up
the more extended normative inquiry of Part III.
A.

Machine Learning as a Substitute for Human Decisions

A machine-learning algorithm in its most general terms solves a “learning problem ... of
improving some measure of performance when executing some task through some type of training
experience.”95 Such algorithms come in two forms: supervised and unsupervised.96 Supervised
machine learning algorithm are commonly prompted to define a function f(x) which produces an

93

James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).

94 I avoid this term because it has a potentially wider and more ambiguous scope. Cf. STUART RUSSELL & PETER
NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 2-14 (3d ed. 2013) (offering a series of alternative definitions
of AI that include thinking and acting humanly as well as rationally).
95

M.I. Jordan & T.M. Mitchell, Machine learning: Trends, perspectives, and prospects, 349 SCIENCE 255, 255 (2015).

96 LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 436, 442 (discussing the relatively higher frequency of supervised as opposed to
unsupervised instruments).
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output y for any given input x. It classifies x in terms of y.97 Its outputs hence take the form of a
sorting of x onto categories of y98: for example, images into the classes of “face” and “not face”;
suspects into the classes of “dangerous” and “not dangerous”; or shoppers into the classes of “impulse
purchasers” or “not impulse purchasers.” These classifications are correlational and not causal in
nature. An algorithm’s performance is measured in terms of how well it captures the strength of the
relation of x to y, not by its ability to discern an actual causal relationship of x and y.99 Its success in
that regard is a function of the extent to which it can “optimize a performance criterion using example
data or past experience.”100 At bottom, this task is analogous to the function performed by familiar
tools such as ordinary least squares and logistic regression analysis.101 Machine learning tools, however,
typically outperform those tools by an order of magnitude in terms of predictive accuracy; they also
tend to generate results with lower bias and lower variance than ordinary regression.102 They do so
because their algorithms dynamically update the models used to map relationships within the data as
new examples are introduced. They thus “learn[] rules from data” about how to better perform their
task in the course of executing it.103
An unsupervised machine-learning algorithm uses the same computational tools to a slightly
different end. It begins with unlabeled training data, and then develops classifications based on the
data’s immanent structure rather than any ex ante guidance by the programmer.104 Provided a set of
online images, for instance, an unsupervised algorithm might sort them into any number of categories,
none of which have been specified a priori: cats v. not cats; people v. objects, etc. These categories
Id. This process can also be described in terms of a “classifier” rather than a function, that examines inputs
with “feature values” and outputs a class variable. Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning,
COMM. ACM, Oct. 2012, at 78-80 (“A classifier is a system that inputs (typically) a vector of discrete and/or continuous
feature values and outputs a single discrete value, the class.”).
97

98 The values of y must be identified ex ante by the programmer. Comm. on the Analysis of Massive Data et al.,
Frontiers in Massive Data Analysis 104 (2013), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18374 (noting that in supervised
learning, the analyst must actively specify a variable of interest); PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING: THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 14 (2012) (noting that “multi-class classification” is “a machine
learning task in its own right”).

Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 95, at 255-57 (noting that performance can be defined in terms of accuracy, with
false positive and false negative rates being assigned a variety of weights).
99

100

ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 3.

101 IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 34-35 (2016); see also
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 4, at 1158 (developing the parallel). In one respect, the parallel may be inexact. One of the
pioneers of machine learning, Leo Breiman hence contrasts the “data modeling” approach, which starts from the
assumption that a stochastic data model describes the data to hand, and then proceeds to estimate its parameters, and an
algorithmic modeling approach, which makes no assumption about the structure of the data, and then looks for a function
that fits the data. Leo Breiman, Statistical modeling: The two cultures (with comments and a rejoinder by the author), 16 Stat. Sci. 199,
199 (2001).
102 Jon Kleinberg et al., Prediction policy problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 493-94 (2015). For a discussion of
technical tools by which machine learning instruments achieve this advance beyond ordinary regression, see Esteban
Alfaro, Matias Gamez, and Noelia Garcia, Adabag: An R package for classification with boosting and bagging, 54 J. STAT.
SOFTWARE 1, 1-2 (2013) (describing the operation of ‘boosting’ and ‘bagging’ techniques).
103 Ziad Obermeyer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the future—big data, machine learning, and clinical medicine, 13 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 1216, 1217 (2016); PEDRO DOMINGUES, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE
ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 6-7, 23 (2015).
104

FLACH, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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can be imagined as clusters of instances in the data that are more similar to each other than to other
instances. The algorithm identifies these clusters by constructing multiple layers of representation,
with each layer having a different level of abstraction.105 By iteratively updating the boundaries of
different clusters identified within the data at a given layer of representation, the algorithm increases
within-cluster similarity and between-cluster divergence.106 The aim of unsupervised machine learning,
in other words, is “to see what generally happens and what does not.”107
Supervised and unsupervised machine-learning tools generally rest on distinct computational
architectures.108 Among the prominent forms of unsupervised learning methods are associational
learning, cluster analysis, principal component analysis, and multidimensional scaling.109 Supervised
learning relies upon a number of different computational strategies, and two common ones are worth
mentioning. First, some supervised learning employs what are called ‘neural networks.’110 The latter
employ a series of layers of ‘neurons,’ or nodes. Inputs are received by the first layer of neurons, which
apply a function that transforms those inputs. The resulting outputs are then transmitted to other
layers in the network, where they are subject to different transformations, until they reach an output
layer.111 Relations between the neurons are recalibrated constantly by a learning algorithm called a
Hebbian learning rule, which reinforces connections between neurons that are activated at the same
time.112 A second approach is the “random forests” school of algorithms, which generate predictions
by producing thousands of decision trees mapping the data.113 Each “tree” is trained on a random
sample of the training data, and the model returns a prediction that is the majority prediction of the
105

Geoffrey E. Hinton, Learning Multiple Layers of Representation, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 428 (2007).

106 JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 101-02 (2018). The algorithm can be understood
as maximizing these parameters.
107

ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 11.

Some tools are used for both. ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 114 (noting the use of support vector machines for
both structured and unstructured learning). A support vector machine (SVM) is a way of identifying relationships among
variables that would not be apparent from human inspection of the graphical representation of such data. See Isabelle
Guyon, Data Mining History: The Invention of Support Vector Machines, KDNuggets (July 2016),
http://www.kdnuggets.com/2016/07/guyon-data-mining-history-svm-support-vector-machines.html
[https://perma.cc/N459-CRUY] (describing the history of the SVM by one of the scientists that modified the algorithm
in the 1990s).
108

109 Trevor Hastie, Robert Tibshirani & Jerome Friedman, Unsupervised Learning, in THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL
LEARNING 485 (2009). In clustering, for example, “we generate a tree structure with clusters at different levels of granularity

and clusters higher up in the tree are subdivided into smaller clusters” to “find structure in the data” that was previously
unknown. ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 117.
110

The following draws on the lucid account in ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 88-103, and Bengio, supra note 33, at

111

For a useful graphical representation, see Bengio, supra note 33, at 49.

48-49.

112 KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 127 (“Training a neural network involves finding the correct weights
for the connections in the network.”). The standard means to train a neutral network is with an algorithm called a
backpropagation algorithm. This works by assigning random weights to connections in the network, and then updating
those weights each time a training instance is encountered. It is so named because the algorithm passes (or backpropagates)
errors from the output layer to the input layer. Id. at 129-30; James Somers, Is AI Riding a One –Trick Pony?, 120 MIT TECH.
REV. 29, 31 (2017) (offering a nontechnical account of backpropagation that emphasizes its centrality to machine learning).
For the seminal technical account, see David E. Rumelhart, Geoffrey E. Hinton & Ronald J. Williams, Learning
representations by back-propagating errors, 323 NATURE 533 (1986).
113

Leo Breiman, Random forests, 45 MACHINE LEARNING 5, 5 (2001).
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trees in the forest.114 Random forests, and the wider category of decision-tree models in which they
fall, are particularly useful for nominal or ordinal data; in contrast, neural networks work well with
numerical data.115
A more recent development is the technology of deep learning. In deep learning, an algorithm
is constructed with multiple levels of representation, each of an increasing degree of complexity. The
“key aspect” of deep learning is that “layers of features are not designed by human engineers: they are
learned from data using a general-purpose learning procedure.”116 Deep-learning instruments are
especially apt for unsupervised tasks, with no specification of features. They require little “manual
interference,” such that designers “just wait and let the learning algorithm discover all that is necessary
by itself.”117
The ends to which machine learning tools can be put are constrained.118 Most are used for the
(non-causal) prediction of outcomes in the case of supervisory data, or the identification of clusters
or associations (in the case of recommendation systems such as those employed by Netflix and
Amazon). Kelleher and Tierney, indeed, usefully reduce the “real-world” problems amenable to
machine learning to four broad categories: the identification of clusters, or association within a
population; the identification of outliers within a population; the development of associational rules;
and prediction problems of classification and regression.119 In contrast, machine learning tools are of
more limited uses when a problem also requires “estimating the casual effect of an intervention.”120
An example is a recent study of the allocation of hip replacement surgery among otherwise eligible
patients.121 The study used machine-learning tools to identify which patients would live long enough
to benefit from the surgery. But those tools could not estimate the causal effect of the surgery on
patient welfare so as to facilitate a prioritization among those likely to survive long enough to benefit
from the surgery.122 More generally, in the use of machine learning, “causal inference is only possible
when the analyst makes assumptions beyond those required for prediction methods.”123

114

KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 141-42.

115

Id. at 136.

116 LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 436; id. at 438 (“A deep learning architecture is a multilayer stack of simple
modules, all (or most) of which are subject to learning, and many of which compute non-linear input-output mappings.”);
KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 131-32 (“Deep learning networks are simply neural networks that have multiple
layers of hidden units.” (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
117

ALPAYDIN, supra note 3, at 107-08.

Judea Pearl, Theoretical impediments to machine learning with seven sparks from the causal revolution PREPRINT
(2018) (arguing that inability of machine learning to analyze counterfactuals to infer causation
is a major impediment).
118

ARXIV:1801.04016, AT 1-2

119 KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 151-80 (providing examples of these different tasks). Another
typology of uses identifies four uses of machine learning: prioritization, classification, association, and filtering. Bruno
Lepri et al., The tyranny of data? The bright and dark sides of data-driven decision-making for social good, in TRANSPARENT DATA
MINING FOR BIG AND SMALL DATA 3, 4 (2017).
120

Athey, supra note 3, at 483.
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Jon Kleinberg et al., supra note 102.
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Id. at 493.
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Athey, supra note 3, at 484-85 (also flagging limitations due to “incentives and manipulability”).
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B.

Distinguishing Machine from Human Decisions

Machine learning is obviously dissimilar from human decision-making. But how? And why
might that difference matter normatively? I consider here three perspectives on those differences.
First, probably the most obvious discontinuities are in relation to the scale, capacity, and the underlying
mechanisms of machine learning. Second, it is also sometimes said that machine decisions are more
opaque than human ones. I accept the efficiency gap between machines and human, but query its
significance for an inquiry into rights. I doubt, though, whether a transparency gap exists. Rather, even
when the opacity of an algorithm is a function of its complexity and operational unpredictability, it is
not clear that complaints about the greater impenetrability of machines than humans are well founded,
at least when framed as a generalization rather than case-to-case comparisons.124 Finally, I consider
the necessary degree of entanglement between human and machine action.
1.

How Machine and Human Decisions Diverge in Operation

In three ways, machine and human decisions diverge in basic operation: in terms of the basic
architecture of reasoning; in the propensity to err; and in respect to the sheer capacity to complete
identification and prediction tasks. Both the second and the third difference have normative salience—
but not necessarily in ways that bear on a right to a human decision.
At a very elementary level, the architecture of machine learning diverges from that of human
decision-making. It is tempting to think that some forms of computational architecture, in particular,
neural networks, track in some fashion the human brain’s cognitive process.125 But, except at a very
high level of generality, this analogy should be resisted. It is true that the science of human cognition
“influenced the emergence of artificial neural networks.”126 Despite the verbal resonance, “a neural
network is inspired by the brain in the same way that the Olympic stadium in Beijing is inspired by a
bird’s nest,” and is in practice more akin to regression analysis than to the operation of human
neurons.127 Among the first neural networks was the “perceptron,” comprising a single ‘neuron’ or
node, that executed a single non-linear function.128 But it obviously bears little resemblance to the
human brain. And today, whereas the study of human cognition has aimed at taxonomizing “cell types,
molecules, cellular states, and mechanisms for computation and information storage,” the machine
learning field “has largely focused on instantiations of a single principle: function optimization.”129 It
124 For an example of this species of complaint, see W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 419, 421 (2015) (identifying a “type of medicine [that] is “black-box” to everyone by nature of its development…
not … because its workings are deliberately hidden from view”).
125 Davide Castelvecchi, Can We Open the Black Box of AI?, NATURE, Oct. 5, 2016, at 19 (asserting that neural
networks are modeled on the brain).
126

Bengio, supra note 33, at 49.

127 Jayesh Bapu Ahire, Artificial Neural Network: Some Misconceptions, THE MEDIUM, Jan. 27, 2018,
https://medium.com/swlh/artificial-neural-network-some-misconceptions-cb93e80b34bb; Adam H. Marblestone, Greg
Wayne & Konrad P. Kording, Toward an integration of deep learning and neuroscience, 10 FRONTIERS IN COMPUTATIONAL
NEUROSCIENCE 94, 94 (2016) (noting the importance of mathematical advances, and not neuroscience breakthroughs, in
machine learning).
128 The seminal paper is Frank Rosenblatt, The perceptron: a probabilistic model for information storage and organization in
the brain, 65 PSYCH. REV. 386 (1958).
129

Marblestone et al., supra note 127, at 94.
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is thus a mistake to think that machine learning is simply a silicon-based version of a familiar carbonbased process, even if much of the machine-learning agenda is in some sense calibrated in terms of
familiar human capabilities.130
A second margin along which human and machine decisions vary is in terms of quality. Even
in putatively high-quality settings, human decision-making is plagued by the distortive effects of
heuristics,131 implicit bias,132 and sheer noise.133 Machine learning, to be sure, remains vulnerable to
polluted training data and requires ineluctably normative choices in crafting classification rules.134 For
example, text analysis of large corpora, such as can be scraped from the world wide web, are influenced
by biases (race- and gender-related, for instance) that influenced the corpora’s creation.135 Incautiously
deployed, such tools can exacerbate morally suspect social stratification. Yet at the same time, they
can also generate accurate predictions that in practice no human can match.136 If there is a limit to the
predictability of human behavior, it has not yet been identified.137 Even when there is a human
substitute for a decision, studies in a variety of fields suggest that large gains in human wellbeing can
be attained by using a machine learning tool rather than a person.138 For instance, early deployment of
driverless cars will almost certainly reduce dramatically the social toll of traffic accidents.139 As I shall
argue below,140 just as it would be a mistake to ignore the risks involved in the design of machine
130 Consider for instance the problem of reinforcement learning, in which humans are confronted with a difficult
task, and must derive efficient representations of the environment from high-dimensional sensory inputs to solve new
challenges. This is a task that machine learning is just starting to address. Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control
Through Deep Reinforcement Learning, 518 NATURE 529, 529 (2015).
131 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 570, 571
(1998) (finding anchoring bias).
132 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195
(2009) (documenting implicit racial bias in the decisions of trial judges).
133 Daniel L. Chen & Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications?,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW
237, 237 (2017) (finding that case-relevant factors explain only about one-third of the outcomes in asylum decisions).
134

inequalities).

See Huq, supra note 45, at – (discussing flawed training data and moral choices created by background racial

135 Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson, and Arvind Narayanan, Semantics derived automatically from language corpora contain
human-like biases, 356 SCIENCE 183, 183 (2017).

For example, recent applications include better programming of traffic signals to minimize aggregate traffic.
Rose Yu et al., Deep learning: A generic approach for extreme condition traffic forecasting, Proceedings of the 2017 SIAM International
Conference on Data Mining 777-785 (2017).
136

Jake M. Hofman et al., Prediction and explanation in social systems, 355 SCIENCE 486, 487-88 (2017) (describing
these limits as an “open” question).
137

Kleinberg et al., supra note 102, at 494 (medical decisions); Jon Kleinberg et al., Human decisions and machine
predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237 (2017) (bail). In my view, the bail example is ambiguous because welfare gains depend on
how other actors in the criminal justice system respond to the prospect of more targeted instruments of pretrial coercion.
It is not at all clear their response will be to use coercion less often or more wisely.
138

139 For an argument in favor of accelerated implementation of driverless cars on social welfare grounds, see Nidhi
Kalra and David G. Groves, The Enemy of Good: Estimating the Cost of Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles (2017)
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2150.html (recommending rapid introduction of driverless vehicles on
safety grounds).
140

See infra Part III.C.
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learning tools, then, so too it would be error to ignore the range of social goods that can be generated
by their employ.
A third and related difference between machine and human decision-making is sheer capacity.
An algorithmic instrument can “sift through vast numbers of variables, looking for combinations that
reliably predict outcomes” to generate “enormous numbers of predictors—sometimes, remarkably,
more predictors than observations—and combining them in nonlinear and highly interactive ways.”141
There are hence instances in which machine learning can detect patterns and offer predictions that
would necessarily escape human cognition.142 Note, though, that an absolute difference in
computational capacity, however, does not distinguish machine-learning cleanly from other
transformational technologies. No human can run as fast as a readily available passenger car can drive.
No human can execute mathematical operations as quickly as a common pocket calculator can. And
no human can see as far as a modern telescope, or as deep into materials as a modern microscope.
Changes in the scale of capability, that is, are endemic to technological evolution. Moreover, just like
other transformative technologies, machine-learning tools are likely to remain outperformed by
humans in respect to some tasks. Indeed, it is striking that the most sophisticated forms of deep
learning are used today to execute functions such as speech or handwriting recognition—functions
that most children manage with ease.143 Most importantly, as I have already emphasized, machinelearning algorithms are well-designed for prediction problems, but not honed for the sort of causal
inference problems with which econometrics has traditionally been concerned.144
At least in theory, therefore, machine learning is capable of better (in the sense of more
accurate) predictions than humans. This capacity is not always realized. But legal design, including the
design of rights, is best thought of dynamic rather than static. That is, it should be aimed at eliciting
improvements in state action. From a dynamic perspective, the space for improvement in machine
decisions provides a reason to think that a right to a human decision risks stymying beneficial
institutional changes.
2.

The Opacity of Other (Human and Machine) Minds

It is commonly asserted that algorithmic decisions derived from machine-learning instruments
are more opaque, and hence more resistant to explanation, than human decisions. Machine learning
is said to involve processes “which [are] not explainable in human language.”145 It rests instead on “the

141

Obermeyer & Emanuel, supra note 103, at 1216-17.

142 Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 4, at 1159 (“By eschewing [a] dependency on existing knowledge and the need
to identify the functional form of any relationships, machine learning can apply to a wider range of problems and yield
vastly enhanced accuracy over its alternatives, whether human intuition, expert judgment, or traditional statistical
techniques”).
143 See, e.g., Cheng-Lin Liu et al., Handwritten Digit Recognition: Benchmarking of State-of-the-Art Techniques, 36 PATTERN
RECOGNITION 2271 (2003).
144

88 (2017).

Sendhil Mullainathan & Jann Spiess, Machine learning: an applied econometric approach, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 87-

145 Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1568 (2013) (acknowledging “the important
strengths of transparency,” but also flagging its limits in reference to predictive tools); accord Knight, supra note 9
(advocating transparency); see also Alyssa Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing Algorithms, 103
IOWA L. REV. 303, 344-46 (2017) (advocating that freedom-of-information laws extend to nonstate providers of

21
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382521

high dimensionality of data, complex code, and changeable decision-making logic.”146 This concern
with transparency seems to motivate in part the demand for a right to a human decision.147 The
empirical predicates of this claim hence warrant separate treatment.
To begin with, we should rule out a common complaint about algorithmic transparency. This
hinges on the unwillingness of the corporate entities that own the machine-learning instrument to
disclose their details for fear of economic harm.148 Such secrecy does not plainly distinguish machine
from human decisions. There is not much ultimate difference between the use of trade secrets law, or
other forms of intellectual property protection for algorithms, and the use of contractual clauses such
as do-not-compete clauses, to prevent the diffusion of technical information.149 There is nothing
distinctive, that is, in the fact that it is a machine rather than a person who is being shielded by law
from examination.
More plausibly, the idea of distinctive machine opacity hinges on the complex, recursive, and
unprogrammed way in which computational algorithms operate. Machine learning is typically applied
to “problems for which encoding an explicit logic of decision-making functions very poorly.”150 The
classification rule identified by a machine-learning tool can be a dynamic function of (for example) a
neural network rather the result of one sequence of calculations.151 But replicating or understanding
the network’s emergent properties strains human imagination. Mere examination of “complicated or
obfuscated” source code reveals little about how the program operates in the real world.152 From an
ex post perspective, therefore, there is a sense that algorithms may not be transparent because it is
impossible to reconstruct the grounds upon which a given decision was reached.
But this kind of preclusive ex post complexity need not be taken as a technological given.
Computer scientists have suggested that it is possible to guarantee ex ante “a tamper-evident record
that provides nonrepudiable evidence of all nodes’ actions.” 153 From this record, “faulty” nodes in a

algorithmic tools); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (arguing for oversight and transparency).
146

Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate 3 BIG DATA & SOC. 1, 3 (2016).

147

See supra text accompanying notes 9 to 13.

148 For examples of this concern, see Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 , 1350 (2018) (documenting “the introduction of trade secret evidence into criminal
cases”); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 12-15 (2013).
149 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Enforceability Tbd: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 869, 871
(2016) (arguing that employment “contracts serve firms as means to enclose information beyond traditional intellectual
property boundaries without adequate notice or debate”).
150

Jenna Burrell, How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms, 3 J. BIG DATA & SOC. 1,

151

Id. at 8.

6 (2016).

152 Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 647; Joshua A. Kroll, The fallacy of inscrutability, PHIL TRANS. SOC. A376 (2018)
(describing such disclosure as “neither necessary nor sufficient” for improving understanding).

Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kuznetsov & Peter Druschel, PeerReview: Practical Accountability for Distributed Systems,
41 ACM SIGOPS Operating Sys. Rev. 175, 175 (2007); Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 662-65 (same); Deven R. Desai &
Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 10-11(2017) (same).
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machine-learning system can be detected.154 In effect, the consequences of pivotal elements of an
algorithm’s architecture can be isolated and analyzed. Alternatively, it may be possible to offer
“multiple diverse counterfactual[s]” to an algorithm, testing thereby the effect of incremental changes
to input outcomes even after the fact.155 This has a human analog of sorts in experimental tests of the
trolley problem.156 Finally, some kinds of algorithmic design may be more amenable to interpretation
than others.157 Models that are simply to learn tend to be simpler to represent.158 A designer thus can,
within limits, select for a computational architecture’s amenability to explanation. Alternatively, it is
possible to “approximate the model in simpler form” even after it has been created and applied in the
wild.159 The absence of a capacity to generate an explanation of the requisite sort that enables relevant
evaluation of a machine learning tool’s effects on the world is “merely a design choice, not an
inevitability of the complexity of large system.”160
Given the availability of mechanisms for investigating machine learning decisions—some of
which parallel methods for understanding human decision-making—it cannot be said a priori that the
former are any more opaque than humans.161 True, specialized tools are necessary for interrogating
algorithmic results. But the elaborate evidentiary rules that courts have developed for evaluating
human testimony suggests that experts are just as needful to the task of understanding human
testimony. The simple fact that the diagnostic tools for understanding machine decisions are more
alien than those for human decisions does not make them either more or less penetrating.
If there are not systemic reasons to think that machine decisions are always more opaque than
human decisions, consider the possibility of a rough equality between human and machine
transparency, at least across the mine run of cases. To begin with, notice that other minds are just as
much black boxes as machine-learning instruments. There simply is “no generally accepted theory of

154

Haeberlen et al., supra note 153, at 175.

155 Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual explanations without opening the black box:
Automated decisions and the GDPR 13-14 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063289. (“Finding
a closest possible world to x such that the classification changes is, under the right choice of distance function, the same
as finding the smallest change to x”). Studies of deep-learning visual recognition tools reveal that even small perturbations
in inputs can generate categorical classification changes. See S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, & P. Abbeel,
Adversarial attacks on neural network policies, arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.02284 (2017). These are both “subject-centered” rather
than “model centered” approaches. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why A "Right to an Explanation'
Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, DUKE L. & TECH. REv., December 4 2017, at 18, 56.
156 See, e.g., Alessandro Lanteri, Chiara Chelini & Salvatore Rizzello, An experimental investigation of emotions and
reasoning in the trolley problem, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 789, 789-90 (2008).
157 Desai & Kroll, supra note 153, at 11 n.61 (suggesting that decision tree, naïve Bayes, and rule learners are easier
to interpret than neural networks or support vector machines).
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Michael Gleicher, A Framework for Considering Comprehensibility Modeling, 4 BIG DATA 72, 82 (2016).

Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085,
1110-12 (2018).
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160 Kroll, supra note 152, at 3. For a useful discussion of both why different kinds of explanation differ, and how
to craft effective responses, see Menaka Narayanan et al., How do Humans Understand Explanations from Machine Learning
Systems? An Evaluation of the Human-Interpretability of Explanation, arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00682 (2018).

Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333,
355-56 (2019).
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how cognitive phenomena arise from computations in cortex,”162 or of whether consciousness serves
any “significant function” for an organism.163 Nor is there even a generally held folk theory that fills
the gap. As one former biophysics professor observed, “we make decisions in areas that we don’t fully
understand every day,” and “can’t explain the complex underlying basis for how we arrived at a
particular conclusion.”164 The bigger the decision, moreover, the less amenable it can be to reasoned
resolution.165
The problem of human decisions’ opacity is acute when it comes to understanding other
minds. We do not hold in our minds clear and distinct (let alone accurate) explanations of how other
people think.. Nor do we have direct access to their cognitive processes. Nevertheless, we are able to
interact with them successfully. We are even able to impute meaningfully to them beliefs and other
mental states in ways that are not obviously fallacious. Further, another person’s beliefs and mental
states can be interrogated after the fact (as can our beliefs about their beliefs and mental states). Indeed,
in many instances, humans “generate and store the information needed to explain [a] decision” and
can be asked to produce that information after the fact.166 Problems of sincerity and candor abound.
But these are not treated as insoluble by the law. Transparency when it comes to other minds, in other
words, may not always be possible as a theoretical or practical matter. But it may also not be always
needful.
Social action based on the understanding that other people have beliefs and mental states
requires a skill known as mentalizing. It is a capability that precedes sophisticated cognition. Most
people (at least over the age of four who are not law professors) navigate the social world on the
working assumption that other people have minds.167 Some reasonable proportion of the time, our
beliefs about other minds are even close enough to the mark to permit effectual social interactions.168
Further, the absence of generally accessible or widely understood explanations of the biochemical
processes through which cognition occurs does not appear to undermine the ability to mentalize or
to make judgments about others’ beliefs and mental states. The absence of effectual transparency
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Leslie G. Valiant, What must a global theory of cortex explain?, 25 CURRENT OP. IN NEUROBIOLOGY 15, 15 (2014).

163 David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness and its function, 46 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 829, 831, 839 (2008) (arguing that
it does facilitate “rational thinking intentional actoon, executive function, or complex reasoning”).
164 Vijay Pande, Artificial Intelligence’s ‘Black Box’ Problem is Nothing to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2018; see also Saul
Levmore & Frank Fagan, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Rules and Standards 7 (2018) (draft on file with author) (“The
best judges, like the best athletes and teachers, are often unable to identify the reasons for their success.”).
165 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting, 58 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPP. 157, 158-59
(2006) (describing a category of “big” decisions that cannot be resolved by standard cost-benefit analysis).
166

at 9 (2017).

Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AI under the law: The role of explanation, arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.01134

Rebecca Saxe, Susan Carey & Nancy Kanwisher, Understanding other minds: linking developmental psychology and
functional neuroimaging, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 87, 94-95 (2004). There appear to be particular regions of the brain
responsible for this capacity. Id. at 99-100.
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Chris D. Frith & Uta Frith, Interacting minds--a biological basis, 286 SCIENCE 1692, 1692 (1999) (characterizing
“the capacity to understand and manipulate the mental states of other people and thereby to alter their behavior” as an
important component of “social intelligence”).
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when it comes to other people’s mental processes, in short, is a problem for philosophers.169 It is not
necessarily a problem for the rest of us.170
So it is far from clear that transparency is systematically more inaccessible for machine rather
than human interlocutors.171 In both domains, ex ante regulation can elicit better rather than worse
contemporaneous records ex post. Technical skills are required to interpret evidentiary records in both
domains. And with machines and humans alike, there are some reasons for thinking that transparency
falls short at least in some class of cases.172 A difference of a predictable and stable sort between the
two domains, as a general matter, is hard to discern.173 A healthy dose of skepticism about the putative
opacity gap between machines and humans takes off the table on empirical grounds one potential
justification for the right to a human decision. If human and machine decisions are similarly opaque,
albeit in different ways, that is, a right to the former cannot be explained in terms of mere legibility.
The arguments explored in Part III, therefore, must be carefully framed to avoid any assumption about
necessary differentials in opacity.
C.

The Entanglement of Human and Machine Decisions

There is yet one other perplexing preliminary of an empirical rather than a legal cast: to what
extent it is even empirically plausible to imagine that there can be a ‘machine decision’ that is
acoustically separate from a human decision? Article 22 of the GDPR envisages the possibility of
decisions “based solely on automated processing.”174 But it there really such a beast?
Perhaps not—for three reasons. First. all machine learning tools are at their origin the fruit of
specific human design and engineering choices. There is no such thing as a wholly endogenous
algorithm.175 And the design of a machine-learning tool is not a mechanical task. It is freighted with

169 The classic statement of the problem is Norman Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds, 55 J. PHIL. 969, 969-70
(1958) (invoking Mill for the question how one can know that there are indeed other minds). There is an equally old
tradition that such thoroughgoing skepticism is self-refuting. See ANITA AVRAMIDES, OTHER MINDS 5-6 (2001) (tracing
this skepticism to the common sense philosopher Thomas Reid).
170

Recall here Samuel Johnson’s famous refutation of Bishop Berkeley.

171 In other words, knowing that one is dealing with a machine or a human may not tell you much about how
transparent a decision is going to be. Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 166, at 9 (“[T]here may be situations in which it is
possible to demand more from humans, and other situations in which it might be possible to hold AI systems to a higher
standard of explanation.”).
172 Moreover, some have argued that transparency is a flawed solution because it “may occlude the true problems
which rest in societal power relations and institutions as much as the software tools employed.” Edwards & Veale, supra
note 155, at 68; accord Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the transparency ideal and its application
to algorithmic accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY 973 (2018) (offering a critique of transparency as a “neoliberal”
solution).

Paradoxically, there may be more ways of checking algorithmic decisions than human decisions. Consider, for
example, the robustness of encryption algorithms, which rest not on ‘explanation’ but on formal mathematical proofs.
Doshi-Velez et al., supra note 166, at 11. It is hard to think of a parallel with humans.
173

174

GDPR § 22(1) (emphasis added).

175 In late 2017, Google announced its AutoML project, which aimed to create “a machine-learning algorithm
that learns to build other machine-learning algorithms.” Cade Metz, Building A.I. That Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2017, at B1. Similar research is ongoing at Carnegie Mellon University. See Renato Negrinho & Geoff Gordon,
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normative choices. A designer must select a certain kind of algorithmic architecture—a neural
network, a decision-tree-based model such as random forests, or something else. The choice is a
difficult one and necessarily evaluative in character. All forms of machine learning, moreover, have
distinctive learning biases—that is particular functions that they are more likely to employ during
analysis. Finding the “best match” between an algorithm’s learning bias and a data set impels an
exercise of human judgment.176
The call for human judgment does not end there. Consider the process of a deep learning
instrument’s start-up. In this form of machine learning, a multilayered neural network must be created.
The instrument’s designer must determine how many layers to build in, and how many neutrons to
include in each layer.177 The designer must then decide how to connect the network’s different
elements. She might chose to create a recurrent neural network, in which the network’s topology is
looped. Each neuron processes inputs in the context of the previous inputs processed, creating a sort
of “memory.”178 Alternatively, she might craft a convolutional neural network, in which localized
groups of neurons are trained to recognize particular patterns regardless of where they appear in the
data (for example, an eye or a nose in a visual recognition system).179 The choice of network topology,
again, is a human decision grounded in the quiddities of human conduct. Nothing intrinsic to the
actual algorithm can answer that question.
Second, the human role in machine learning is not limited to the initial design of an algorithm.
A designer must also select the data upon which the machine learning instrument is initially trained.
This training data, moreover, is generally not produced by an algorithm. It is a function of human
action. As a result, it can replicate the biases and blind-spots of the individuals who created it.180 For
example, in the policing context, there is a concern that historical arrest data, if used to drive future
deployment decisions, will reflect and reproduce the troubling assumptions about racial proclivities
toward crime that have been prevalent among police officers in the past.181 Having collected data, a
designer needs to preprocess and transform that data, adjust the algorithm’s parameters in light of the
data, and fine-tune the algorithm based on the quality of the results.182 Saul Levmore and Frank Fagan,
arguing for the inevitability of human-machine partnerships, additionally suggest that missing data
problems mean that human “thinking about data-selection and goal-setting” will inevitably be needed
DeepArchitect: Automatically Designing and Training Deep Architectures, arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.08792 (2017). A human
engineer is still needed to guide some of the search processes over different potential architectures. Id. at 1.
176 KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 99-100; see also Casey & Niblett, supra note 161, at 354 (“[H]umans
are involved in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and assessing the merits of the algorithm.”).
177

Bengio, supra note 33, at 50.

178

KELLEHER & TIERNEY, supra note 106, at 133.

179

Id.; see also LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 439 (discussing convolutional networks in general terms).

180 On biases, see Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 680 (“[A]lgorithms that include some type of machine learning can
lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical examples that reflect past prejudice or implicit
bias”). On blind-spots, see Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html
(noting
problems that can arise from missing data).
181

Huq, supra note 45, at --.

182

Saleema Amershi et al., Power to the people: The role of humans in interactive machine learning, 35 AI MAGAZINE 105,

105 (2014).
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even after a system is up-and-running.183 As they intimate, the implementation as well as the design
process for machine learning is punctuated by “lengthy and asynchronous iterations” of humanmachine interaction that ensure that machine-learning is always critically molded by a human hand.184
Third, once up and running, machine learning tools still need “human caretakers,” tasked with
everything from moderating the results of deep-learning algorithms used to simulate vision to
maintenance workers who clean and repair the data centers used to house large pools of information
necessary for algorithms’ operation.185 The process of learning within neural networks also “require[s]
close involvement by a human,” who must craft labels for training data, and then generate hypotheses
that guide the process of optimization.186
The idea of a machine that will run of its own accord, in short, appears far from accurate. To
be sure, this could change. Some deep learning instruments already require “very little learning by
hand” at the third stage (although their design still presents considerable challenges).187 But at least for
the time being, a machine learning instrument rests on a foundation of human design and
performance-specification decisions. The possibility of a purely machine decision, again for now,188
lies beyond the technological event horizon.
That empirical fact raises a question about how precisely the notion of a decision “based solely
on automated processing”189 should be construed. This is so even if no human designer could either
replicate the cognitive labor of the algorithm or alternatively predict every classification choice the
algorithm would ultimately make. A literal understanding of the right to a human decision, it follows,
is not plausible. But that need not mean the idea of a solely autonomous machine decisions should be
jettisoned. Another possible interpretation of the intuition behind a right to a human decision would
focus not on the absolute extent of human involvement, but on the timing and quality of such
involvement. The design and training of machine learning that I have stressed here occurs largely ex
ante. Human involvement contemporaneous to an algorithm’s operation comprises trivial or largely
ministerial action. The demand for a human decision might be construed as hinged more narrowly on
the slice of time in which a machine acts in respect to a specific case. It is a demand, that is, that in
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Levmore & Fagan, supra note 164, at 8.

184

Amershi et al., supra note 182, at 105.
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AINow,
AINOW
2017
REPORT
12
(2017),
https://assets.ctfassets.net/8wprhhvnpfc0/1A9c3ZTCZa2KEYM64Wsc2a/8636557c5fb14f2b74b2be64c3ce0c78/_AI
_Now_Institute_2017_Report_.pdf.
186 Bengio, supra note 33, at 50-51 (flagging the risk that a “learning algorithm can get stuck in what is called a
local minimum, in which it is unable to reduce the prediction error of the neural network by adjusting parameters slightly”);
see also Amershi et al., supra note 182, at 106 (describing “iterative exploration of the model space” by practitioners once a
learning algorithm is up and running) .
187

LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 436.

188 A recent survey finds a one in two chance that high-level machine intelligence will be developed around 2040–
2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075. V.C. Müller & N. Bostrom, Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert
opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 555, 555-56 (2016).
189
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the immediate “transactional frame” 190 of human/machine interaction, humans should not lie on one
temporal side of the interaction alone. Viewed through temporal blinders, this assumes that the fact a
human engineer once calibrated the machine with which one is enacting is cold comfort, or no comfort
at all.
On this interpretation, the demand for a human decision bears a family resemblance to a
“standard,” as opposed to a rule, as defined in the law-and-economics literature: a norm that is given
content after regulated subjects act rather than beforehand.191 Just as the rules/standards distinction
hinges on the timing (and to some extent the degree of specification192) of a norm, so the idea of a
right to a human decision introduces an assumption that ultimately the normative grounds for an
action can be supplied only by a human rather than a machine actor intervening after the
computational processes of an algorithm have come to a close.193 This suggests that to the extent that
the Working Party Guidelines to Art. 22(1) of the GDPR are ambiguous, they should be interpreted
as mandating “meaningful” and “ex post” review.194 This suggests that Article 22(1) should be read to
be violated only when there is an absence of ex post, as opposed to ex ante, human involvement. The
GDPR also does not explain how the quality of such review is to be assessed.195
To summarize, the right to a human decision is not plausibly understood to mean simply the
right to a decision with some human element, however timed and however substantive: To define the
right that way would rob it of effectual content given present technological constraints. But if it is not
meaningful to speak of machine decisions that do not have a human in the loop, there is a question
as to why the timing of necessary human involvement makes a practical difference. If the right to a
human decision is not to boil down to something like an aesthetic preference, the normative grounds
for a right timed in this fashion must be supplied. This is the question taken up in Part III.

190 Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk As A Modality of Urban Policing,
101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2402 (2017) (noting that a “narrow, individualist ‘transactional frame’ … currently dominates
both law and economics).
191

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-63 (1992).

192 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1407 (2017)
(“Rules are precise and ex ante in nature…. Standards, on the other hand, are imprecise when they are enacted.”).

The draft Universal Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence awkwardly recognizes the relevance of temporality
by stating that when it is not “possible or practical to insert a human decision prior to an automated decision,” then there
should be a human focus on outcomes. The Public Voice, Draft Universal Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence, at 1,
https://epic.org/international/AIGuidleinesDRAFT20180910.pdf.
193

194 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 59, at 21-22 (excluding from Article 22(1) instances in which a human
“reviews and takes account of other factors in making a final decision”); see also supra text accompanying note 195.
195 It is not clear what “meaningful” supervision entails. See Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, Clarity, surprises, and
further questions in the Article 29 Working Party draft guidance on automated decision-making and profiling, 34 COMP. L. & SEC. REV.
398, 401(2018) (“How this expanded notion of ‘solely’ could practically be assessed from the point of view of the data
controller or the data subject is one of the significant grey areas th[e] guidance leaves in its wake.”). In addition, if an
automated process does not change “legal rights” or have an “equivalent or similarly significant” effect, the Working Party
suggests that it is not covered by Article 22(1). Working Party Guidelines, supra note 59, at 21-22 (noting that while
targeted advertising is not typically covered, the “intrusiveness” of the targeting, an individual’s expectations, and the
operator’s knowledge of the “vulnerabilities” of the person might render it covered by Article 22(1)).
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D.

Conclusion

Machine learning denotes a large field of heterogenous and evolving computational forms.
What is mapped here barely scratches its surface obviously. I have stressed some of the central
taxonomical lines sufficiently to allow intelligent discussion of the right to a human decision. I have
further explored dimensions along which a machine decision might be deemed categorically distinct
from its human counterpart. This discussion should clarify the stakes of claiming human as distinct
from machine determinations.
At a very general level, scale (capacity) and mechanisms do vary systematically between
humans and machines, but one must be careful about leaping from that conclusion to a claim about
right. Machines have the capacity to classify and predict with fewer errors than humans. At least from
a dynamic perspective, this suggests that legal rules should incentivize the creation of better machines,
rather than their substitution with humans. In contrast, transparency, which is a focal point for much
legal scholarship, does not provide a meaningful point of distinction between humans and machines.
Finally, I have suggested that most algorithms in operation now (and arguably for the next twenty
years) will be shaped and orientated by human action. If a right to a human decision is to have
meaningful content now, therefore, it must be understood to require human judgment at a particular
moment: after a machine learning instrument in the wild encounters and classifies a human actor. Any
other definition is either technologically infeasible or too easily satisfied to allow the putative right to
stand as a coherent, independent entity.
III.

The Normative Grounds of the Right to a Human Decision

With this technological context in hand, this Part explores the best available normative account
of a right to a human decision. I do not start from the presumption that a right to a human decision
is warranted. To the contrary, by airing the best normative grounds for recognizing this right, I hope
to make a judgment as to whether the right is worth embedding into law, and if so for what reasons.
I focus on state applications of machine-learning tools. As I have noted, criminal justice and welfare
administration have to date been characterized by the most rapid uptake of such tools in helping
determine who is stopped by police, who is imprisoned before (or after) trial, and who receives public
benefits.196 The case of the person who is subject to coercion, or denied a benefit, because of a mistake
machine decision is the most compelling instantiation of why a right to a human decision might be
warranted. I thus assume that something material is at stake when the machine (or human) decides,
an assumption that is not always satisfied in the context of private uses of machine learning.
For the sake of exposition,197 I delineate three kinds of reasons for a right to a human decision
(understood, per Part II, as a right to ex post human review). The first is subject-focused, in that it trains
on the actions, or potential actions, of the subject of the algorithmic classification rule. This class of
reasons builds on the intuition that a nonhuman instrument forecloses certain opportunities for the
exercise of meaningful human agency. The second cluster of reasons is classifier-focused. These build on
the intuition that the state in particular owes to individuals a certain kind of decision, without regard
to whether the individual can, or would be likely to, respond or seek to alter that decision. The third
group of reasons focuses on systemic effects. Whereas the first and the second kinds of reasons narrowly
196

See supra text accompanying note 31.

That is, my categories are instruments of convenience, and not mean to capture any underlying moral facts, if
such things exist.
197
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train upon the interaction between the individual and the classifier, this class of reasons dilates the
lens, capturing the possibility of spillover consequences that unfold only dynamically and cumulatively.
I shall argue that none of these clusters of reasons provide secure normative ground for a right to a
human decision. Although systemic effects in particular have some force, they are poorly suited to
work as foundations for an individual right.
My approach is not to lean upon the jurisprudence of any specific legal right, but to consider
instead the widest possible range of normative theories. It is hence possible (and even likely) that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial would, as interpreted by the Supreme Court mechanically
foreclose a machine decision on facts related to guilt or innocence.198 My project here, however, is not
focused on mechanical application of the law: I am interested in whether there is a plausible normative
theory upon which that application can rest. (And if the answer is no, so much the worse for Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence). Moreover, the taxonomy of reasons offered here does not rely solely on
ambiguous, portmanteau concepts such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘dignity.’199 These concepts, to be sure,
have played a leading role in normative theorizing about the state’s obligations in respect to various
decision-making processes under the rubric of “due process.”200 But terms such as “autonomy” and
“dignity” require specification. They have wide and variegated intellectual histories within and beyond
the law. For example, a 2011 survey of the manner in which the Supreme Court used the word
“dignity” found five different usages by the Justices alone: “status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty
as dignity, personal integrity as dignity, and collective virtue as dignity.”201 And in the philosophical
tradition, Schopenhauer once described dignity as “the shibboleth of all the perplexed and emptyheaded moralists who concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of any real basis in
morals.”202 Abstract and vague normative terms such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘dignity’ are generally useful
only after they have been colored and bounded through the invocation of a full blooded normative
theory.203
198

See supra text accompanying notes 71 to 72.

These ideas have been invoked in other scholarship on algorithmic tools as decisive normative grounds—not
always in the clearest of fashions. See, e.g., Tal Z. Zarsky, The trouble with algorithmic decisions: An analytic road map to examine
efficiency and fairness in automated and opaque decision making, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 118, 118-19 (2016) (invoking
“autonomy-related concerns that involve harms to individual dignity”); see also Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 696 (2017) (offering a similar argument).
199

200 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (identifying “individual dignity and autonomy” as
among “the fundamental liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause”); accord Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 901-04 (1981) [hereinafter ‘Mashaw, Administrative Due Process’]
(discussing dignitary definition of due process).
201 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 190 (2011); see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 16 (2004)
(canvassing the use of the term “dignity” in state law and international law). For a similar taxonomy of different usages of
“autonomy,” see John Christman, Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy, 99 ETHICS 109 (1988)
(reviewing the conceptions of autonomy employed in recent philosophical literature); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two
Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876-77 (1994) (distinguishing a “descriptive” and an “ascriptive” sense of
autonomy in reference to First Amendment debates).
202

MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 1 (2012) (citation omitted).

203 For example, Martha Nussbaum has employed the capabilities approach to human wellbeing to give the idea
of dignity meaningful content. Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND
BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 351 (Adam Schulman & Martha C.
Nussbaum, eds., 2008). Jeremy Waldron uses the history of human rights law to discern a conception of dignity that turns
on a repudiation of certain kinds of social ranking. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (2012). Neither of

30
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382521

To avoid question-begging arguments, I think it is useful to begin with quite specific ways in
which machine decisions might implicate particular normative values. I also think it is useful to assume
that the algorithm in question does not rely on tainted training data, has not been malignantly
manipulated, and has been competently designed. That is, I will not stack the deck by assuming the
machine decision to be flawed ab initio. Further, I return in my conclusion to the law of law in
catalyzing improvements in the accuracy of state classification.
Before turning to the three potentially positive grounds for a right to a human decision, I
consider first an appealing ground that turns out on closer inspection to have little load-bearing
capacity. This is the notion of accuracy. Having gotten this out of the way, I then analyze whether any
of the three clusters of normative values that might be used to support a right to a human decision do
so. I conclude that the foundations for this right are far from secure.
A.

Accuracy in Decision-Making

To begin with, I think it is useful to clarify one normative strand that is not plausibly braided
into the right to a human decision’s foundation. The Supreme Court has at times suggested that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates an entitlement to an accurate decision.204
Typical of the Court’s pronouncements in this regard is its assertion that “[t]he function of legal
process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of fact-finding, is to
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”205 It is tempting to define this as a right to an accurate and
true decision. If a decision deviates from ground truth, then I am wronged. But even in high-stakes
contexts such as criminal cases or postconviction review of capital punishment, the Supreme Court
has shied away from a personal right to a true determination.206 A right to accuracy is instead
understood in probabilistic terms, such as “beyond a reasonable doubt.”207 It is further viewed as an
attribute of an adjudicative process as a whole. A system that can “reduce the risk of error over the
aggregate of cases to an acceptable level”208 is sufficient for constitutional purposes.
these conceptions of dignity is obviously to the fore in the algorithmic context. Writing in a Hegelian vein, Margaret Radin
has suggested that “autonomy is [best] understood as abstract rationality and responsibility attributed to an individual.”
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 960 (1982).
204 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994) (noting that “arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication”
can violate Due Process); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986) (“The due process protections such as notice, hearing, and right to counsel are
valuable because they contribute to the goal of accuracy.”).

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); accord Heller v. Doe
ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) (defining Due Process in terms of an interest in an “accurate determination of the
matters before the court”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews
v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) ‘hereinafter Mashaw, Due Process
Calculus’] (“The Eldridge Court ... views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits
its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect decisions.”).
205

206 See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009) (explaining that whether “actual
innocence” exists as a federal right remains an “open question”); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (explaining
that “actual innocence” has never been held to be an independent constitutional claim).
207 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.”).
208

Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 630 (1997)
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Can a due process right to an accurate decision, understood in these systemic and probabilistic
terms, provide a normative foundation for a right to a human decision? Let’s bracket the idea that a
right to a human decision can be grounded on the idea that a machine is incapable of taking new
evidence from a regulated subject,209 and focus on the pure idea that humans are eo ipso better than
machines. The evidence collated in Part II suggests that the answer will generally be no. As Part II
explained, machine learning performs a set of tasks that overlaps with a set of human decisions.
Because the current crop of algorithmic tools identify correlational rather than causal relationships,
there is a cluster of empirical questions that they are not well designed to answer.210 Although an
individual might have a legitimate complaint if subject to an algorithmic decision on a matter of causal
inference, her claim is not really about accuracy so much as the inaptness of the method employed.
For the class of tasks that can be performed by either a human or a machine-learning tool,
available evidence suggests that the latter will often generate fewer positives and negatives in the
aggregate, than most human decision making.211 This is true in contexts such as pretrial bail212 and
domestic-violence related arraignments.213 So it is not empirically plausible to say that a right to an
accurate decision-maker (in this sense) entails a right to a human decision-maker in these cases.214
Indeed, as the conclusion explores, perhaps the opposite is true such that legal rules might be designed
with an eye to improving, rather than substituting, extant machine decisions.
Consider two possible objections to this position. The first runs as follows: Algorithmic
classification is inappropriate because the state wholly lacks the necessary training data to measure the
variable of interest, and the available data employed to that end is misleading. One can imagine such
an objection being levelled (for instance) against teacher evaluation tools that relied on testing
modalities that failed to elicit useful measures of children’s progress. The problem here, however, is
not the choice to use a machine decision rather than a human decision. Rather, it is the prior (human)
determination to rely on irrelevant data to measure an unquestionably relevant parameter. It is not a
priori obvious that the solution in such cases should be a right to a human decision, as opposed to a
right to a machine decision well-tailored to the task at hand.
Second, where the population being classified by an algorithm is socially stratified (say, by race
or by gender), and where the distribution of errors tracks and reinforces hierarchical fault lines, I think
there are serious normative concerns that warrant careful scrutiny. But their resolution turns out to be
209

See infra Part III.B.2.

210 See Mullainathan & Spiess, supra note 144, at 88 (distinguishing between prediction—the uncovering of
generalizable patterns—and parameter estimation, and noting that machine learning does well the former but not the
latter). The virtue of machine learning tools is their use of “flexible functional forms [that] allow us to fit varied structures
of the data.” Id. at 91-92
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See supra text accompanying notes 136 to 138.
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Kleinberg et al., supra note 138, at 237-38.

Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting domestic violence: A machine learning approach
to help inform arraignment decisions, 13 J. EMP. L. STUD. 94, 110 (2016) (finding that the release rate of 20 percent repeat
offenders in a pool of domestic violent defendants could be dropped to a 10 percent rate through a move from judicial to
machine-led determinations).
213

214 It may be that an algorithmic tool is implemented in such a way that the rate of false positives increase. But
then the objection is the faulty human implementation, and not the algorithm itself.
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quite difficult. Studies of algorithmic bail tools demonstrate that the most common population-wide
measures of false-positive rates cannot simultaneously be equalized.215 Instead, equalizing one measure
of false positives inevitably leads to an inequality in another measure of false positives. This puzzle, I
have suggested elsewhere, is better characterized as a problem of equity rather than accuracy.216 It is
not solved, in any case, by reverting to a more error-prone human decision-making protocol. The
same maldistributions of error can arise, just with higher numbers of false positives, with human
decisions. As a result, this problem should be considered separately from any right to a human
decision.
B.

Subject-Facing Grounds

A more plausible set of normative foundations for a right to a human decision can be
generated by focusing on the person subject to a machine decision. She may feel disempowered and
enervated by her exclusion from any effectual role in the process in which they are engaged. That is,
she experience hedonic loss because of an absence of effectual participation. Second, an automated
decision is seemingly impermeable to human-offered reasons relevant to the decision being taken. The
machine, in other words, extinguishes any opportunity to give reasons that the individual may seek. An
individual may want to give reasons directly pertaining to their treatment and the accuracy of a machine
judgment, or alternatively seek to offer an explanation that runs beyond the formal scope of the
governing rule. That is, they may want to vindicate an accuracy interest with bespoke information or
else see an exception from the rule even if it would normally apply to their case.
I explore here whether a right to a human decision might be predicated on the interest in bare
participation, or alternatively the interest in giving (broadly understood) reasons.217 I conclude that
there are more reasons for skepticism than hope on either ground about the right to a human decision.
1.

Participation

A bare right to be involved in an important decision is often treated as meaningful even when
it cannot be justified or explained in instrumental or accuracy-related terms. That right might be said
to flow from a “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,”218
even if that participatory entitlement will not necessarily alter the outcome of a proceeding. This
interest might be founded on the felt human “need to explain and justify our actions,” such that “the

Roughly speaking, there are different ways of measuring the rate of false positives and false negatives, and the
various metrics almost inevitably point in different directions. For mathematical proof of this point, see Sam CorbettDavies et al., Algorithmic decision making and the cost of fairness, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD ACM SIGKDD
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 797, 798 (2017); Jon Kleinberg,
Sendhil Mullainathan & Manish Raghavan, Inherent trade-offs in the fair determination of risk scores 4, 9 (2016),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807.
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216 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 45, at – (analyzing how different notions of accuracy within a population can be
applied in a criminal justice context, and suggesting that racial equity is advanced by minimizing the aggregate cost to racial
minorities).
217 I use this term to cover both reasons that count as justifications and reasons that count as excuses. Nothing
turns on the difference between them in this context.
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Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
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loss of the opportunity to do so denies our self-worth.”219 Participation, on this view, creates
immediate hedonic gain.220 Alternatively, participation can be framed as the exercise of “moral
responsibility as [an] equal citizen[]” upon which rests the law’s “moral claim to the citizen’s
allegiance.”221 In this noninstrumental vein, participation has been glossed as a morally important
manifestation of autonomy,222 or as a manifestation of dignity.223 The overlap in the scope of those
two general terms is suggestive of their joint and overlapping ambiguity.224
To evaluate the strength of a noninstrumental participation rationale, I consider when and
how that interest is recognized in present law. This is not to assume contemporary law is a precise
measure of moral value. It is not. But it provides a rough guide to the weight that an interest is generally
accorded. If the law now does not recognize a participation interest in situations akin to those in which
a right to a human decision would operate, and if there is no serious objection to that failure, that is
some reason to be skeptical of that right. Conversely, if a right to participate is recognized, or strong
arguments for its recognition exist, this is some reason for thinking the right should be taken more
seriously.
One place where a bare right to participation, even when it is inconsistent with a defendant’s
interest, is embodied in jurisprudence is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.225 The latter
constitutional provision extends to create rights to self-representation and to counsel-of choice in the
criminal adjudication context, notwithstanding the absence of reasons to think the former in particular
yield better outcomes for defendants.226 The strength of the autonomy-related justification for these
219

Mashaw, Administrative Due Process, supra note 200, at 903.

220 Cf. Amershi et al., supra note 182, at 111 (noting that transparency about an algorithm’s operation is related to
greater user satisfaction).
221 T.R.S. Allan, Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect, 18 OXFORD J. LEG. S TUD. 497, 509 (1998). I am not sure
I have a complete response in what follows to Allan’s claim. If that claim is the brute assertion that the state’s moral
legitimacy rests on a particular form of personal participation in legal processes, then it is probably not subject to refutation
by the kind of legal and doctrinal examples I develop below. Because I offer no full-blown theory of the state’s legitimacy
here, I cannot fully respond to this version of the claim. It must suffice here for me to say that I do not find the notion
that the state to be legitimate must generate specific, personal involvement in its deliberation compelling as a general
matter.

Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (1992) (“When an individual participates in
government decisionmaking she has an opportunity not only to influence the accuracy and enhance the legitimacy of the
decision, but also to exercise autonomy”).
222

Mashaw, Due Process Calculus, supra note 205, at 49-52 (identifying dignity as an important consideration for
due process); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication--A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319,
347 (1957) (identifying dignity as a basic due process value).
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In a different formulation of the right to participate, Lawrence Solum has focused on the effect of participation
on the legitimacy of an adjudicative system. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 191, 274 (2004)
(arguing that “a right of participation can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either participation’s effect on
accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication”).
224

225 See U.S. Const. amd VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall… have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.”).
226 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense
shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”). For counsel of choice
doctrine, see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (“[The Sixth Amendment] commands, not that a
trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel
he believes to be best.”); accord Flanagan v United States, 465 US 259, 268 (1984) (reasoning that this right “reflects
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rights remains contested among academics.227 In a recent choice-of-counsel case, nevertheless, a
plurality of the Court described the defendant’s right to elect counsel as “fundamental.”228
The participation interest embodied in these decisions, though, is not necessarily one of
personal involvement, and certainly not a matter of participation in whatever form the defendant thinks
appropriate. The Sixth Amendment extends invariantly to both the right to self-representation and
also the right to choose one’s own counsel. When the Sixth Amendment is manifest through the latter
form (as is more often the case), then there is no interest in personal participation at stake. What is at
stake instead is the free choice of agents (lawyers) who will act as an individual’s representation in a
given proceeding. This can be described as a participation right. But doing so elides the agency
relationship between lawyers and clients, as well as the extent of control exercised by professionals in
the adjudicative context. It is reasonable to think that the relevant autonomy protected by the Sixth
Amendment is that to elect one’s counsel; the right of self-representation on this view, is a byproduct
of this more general right to choose one’s own counsel. It is not an instantiation of a specifically
protected participation interest.
Even if a criminal defendant exercises a right to self-representation, the right is circumscribed
in highly formalized ways that establish “a certain distance” between judges and parties.229 A criminal
defendant who exercises her right of self-representation is not exercising a right to represent herself
in whatever fashion she wishes. To the contrary, she is invoking a highly constrained entitlement under
conditions in which she likely will lack the epistemic competences to navigate. The Sixth Amendment’s
right to participate in one’s own criminal proceeding, therefore, is a highly limited one. It is not clear
on its face whether it should be understood as the normative core of that right, as opposed to an
unanticipated side-effect of creating a general counsel-of-choice regime, one that cannot be narrowed
to exclude self-representation without some elaborate textual or doctrinal legwork. On this view, the
right to participate in a criminal proceeding by invoking the Sixth Amendment is not well understood
as an interest in participation per se, as opposed to a peculiar (and marginal) instantiation of the
defendant’s free election of counsel.230 What is the case in the criminal context spills over also into the
civil context. Any right to participate in a civil proceeding is probably best understood as a right to
participate through an agent such as a lawyer. (We will turn in a moment to the due process interests

constitutional protection of the defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding”). Notice that the same might be said for elections more generally.
Compare John Rappaport, The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice, 2016 SUP. CT.
REV. 117, 118 (2016) (concluding that “majestic-sounding notions of fairness and autonomy, respectively--struggle to
explain counsel-of-choice doctrine”), with Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control
the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010) (defending the doctrine in autonomy terms).
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Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality op.).

Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 47 (2003) (“The formality of the procedure
and the qualification of the decisionmaker as a neutral arbiter of the law ensure a certain distance between decisionmaker
and parties designed to increase the reliability of decisions made, even while it dignifies the parties and the interests at
stake.”).
229

230 Cf. Rappaport, supra note 227, at 118 (characterizing the choice of counsel rule as “a weak, system-level
safeguard against socialization of the criminal defense bar”).
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in notice and a chance to give reasons).231 Perhaps this gap is undesirable.232 But it hardly supports the
intuition that a bare right to participate is sufficiently widely regarded to justify a right to a human
decision.
Most forms of adjudication, moreover, entail a sufficiently complex and formal enterprise that
a right to personal participation in decisions with direct, personal effects is not plausible. As the recent
recognition of Sixth Amendment rights in the plea bargaining context suggests,233 even informal
dispute resolution in the judicial context requires a modicum of technical expertise that few nonlawyer
individual litigants possess. A right to personal participation in adjudication is inconsistent with this
complexity.
Against this background, it is hard to see the force of the noninstrumental, participation-based
argument in favor of a right to a human decision even when life or liberty are at stake. Machine learning
instruments, recall, may not be much more opaque than human decision-makers.234 Similarly, there is
not necessarily much phenomenological distance between the bafflement an unschooled criminal
defendant may reasonably feel when faced with the reticulate and complex forms of the criminal
justice system, and the confusion elicited by an algorithmically derived outcome. For all practical
purposes, both are black boxes. Moreover, there is no real social movement so far as I can tell to make
the criminal adjudicative process simpler—as distinct from fairer or more favorable to defendants—
for its own sake. If the interest in noninstrumental participation gets short shrift under circumstances
in which human liberty will often be directly imperiled, it would be surprising to learn that there was
a powerful human interest in personal participation that carried over into the machine learning
context.
A final reason for resisting a participation-based right to a human decision turns on the
inadequacy of this assertion. An ex post human decision will often not be the optimal response to felt
psychological loss. Often, the best way of ‘explaining’ a discrete decision will not be through human
review, which may cast limited light on the operation of a complex algorithm. At least one algorithmic
tool has been developed instead as a means of “explain[ing] the predictions of any classifier or
regressor in a faithful way.”235 When the instrument most likely to yield a comprehensible account of
machine-learning outputs is itself a machine, the need for a human to diagnose or “soothe”236 the
grievances of affected individuals must rest not on a demand for explanation, but rather on a raw and
unreasoned need for a human interlocutor. But this need for human interaction may be a contingent
feature of social experience, and that which strikes us today as dehumanizing or insensitive will appear
For example, “in absentia” removal proceedings are envisaged, and commonly employed, under Title 8. 8
U.S.C.A. § 1229a(5)(A) (2018).
231
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That said, I am inclined to think in absentia removal is per se objectionable.

233 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (applying Sixth Amendment right to counsel to plea
bargaining that has immigration consequences). For Padilla’s extension beyond the immigration context, see Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
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See supra text accompanying notes 145 to 173.

235 Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh & Carlos Guestrin, Why should I trust you?: Explaining the predictions of any
classifier, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND
DATA MINING 1135, 1135 (2016).
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Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 IND. L.J. 1429, 1432 (2015).
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to our children as merely sensible and mundane.237 Right now, the demand for human review in the
teeth of its likely costs and available alternative responses, might seem little more than an aesthetic
preference about the manner in which one interacts with state actors. I am not sure that is enough to
get a right to a human decision off the ground.
Perhaps there is a way of rehabilitating this psychological argument. Perhaps an individual
subject to a machine decision might seek ex post human review not because she thinks the decision
incorrect, but because she hopes that exogenous factors will prompt some mitigation of the decision’s
consequences. She seeks, in other words, mercy—or the official exercise of discretion to mitigate a
legal consequence that is otherwise a person’s lawful fate.238 But a hope for mercy is a poor foundation
for any ‘right’ to a human decision. Mercy is generally understood as a discretionary act to which one
has no entitlement. As such, mercy is an increasingly elusive quality even in the criminal justice context
where it has probably the most plausible berth.239 Its presently penurious titration may be unwarranted,
but still it is hard to see why the case for reviving mercy would begin in the algorithmic domain.
2.

Reason Giving

But perhaps it is a mistake to think of participation in noninstrumental terms. Instead, it may
be better to focus on the tangible ways in which participation can alter outcomes. There are several
possible arguments to this end. Most obviously, participation matters because of the factual
contributions an individual can make to the consideration of her case. The most important form such
a contribution might take turns on the individual’s ability to supply information, and more generally
to offer reasons, for a decision to be made in her favor.240 Recall that this is the force of Cathy O’Neill’s
anecdote about the welfare applicant Catherine Taylor, which I recounted earlier241: Only Taylor, we
are to presume, had the information needful to a right resolution of her own case, and only human
review could have elicited that information. This argument from reason-giving closely complements
the most plausible technological understanding of a right to a human decision. As Part II explored,
human decisions permeate and structure machine-learning tools.242 The most plausible gloss of a claim
to additional human input needs to hinge on an ex post human role after a machine-learning decision
has been delivered. That would mean an individual subject to a machine decision could speak directly
Robot companions capable of recognizing and dynamically responding to their charges’ mutative emotional
states lie within the technological event horizon. For a review of the current science, see Giulio Sandini et al., Social Cognition
for Human-Robot Symbiosis-Challenges and Building Blocks, 12 FRONTIERS IN NEUROROBOTICS 34 (2018).
237

Aziz Z. Huq, The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1679, 1681 (2015). Mercy generally involves
a “remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke
compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and ability to choose to engage in
criminal conduct.” Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1436 (2004). There will be some instances in which
mercy so defined can be exercised even after an algorithmic classifer has been used to impose a decision.
238

239 On the decline of the pardon, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348–49 (2008). On the decline of the jury as a mitigating institution, see Nancy J. King, Silencing
Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 492–94 (1998).
240 In discussing the right to give reasons in this subsection, I will not distinguish between an individual’s ability
to offer empirical evidence and her ability to proffer legal or normative claims that do not rest on information about the
world. I suspect that in practice reason-giving will entail some blend of factual and normative assertion. To distinguish
them here serves no useful purpose.
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to that decision by drawing it to a human’s attention. Such a right would respond to the possibility,
for instance, that the “feature values” used to train an algorithm excluded some parameter of relevance
to a subset of individuals, but not the general population.243
Separately, the right to give reason might be defended on outcome-independent, yet
instrumental, grounds. In the longer term, for example, participation might work as a balm to those
whose causes falter.244 Consistent with this view, the literature on procedural justice associated with
Tom Tyler has pressed the empirical claim that the opportunity to be heard by an official is associated
with higher rates of legal compliance after an interaction has passed.245 Systemic legitimacy, on the
procedural justice view, flows from an embedding of the opportunity to give reasons in the texture of
citizen interactions with the legal system.246
Arguments of either form might seek doctrinal footing in the Due Process Clause.247 The
requirement of a hearing, to be sure, does not extend to all state decisions that directly and immediately
affect individuals. Legislation and law-like regulations promulgated by agencies, for example, can
dramatically and immediately change an individual’s rights, obligations, and exposure to coercive risk.
Individuals have no entitlement to individualized participation in respect to them.248 The boundary
line between permissible legislative fiat (where due process does not apply) and forms of government
action to which it does attach is not wholly clear. 249 But it does exist. Some commentators suggest,
for example, that “due process requires an oral hearing where particularized deprivations affecting a
small number of people based on adjudicative facts are concerned,”250 regardless of whether the
outcome is denominated as legislation. At least some of the criminal justice and social welfare decisions
for which algorithmic tools are presently used plainly fall within this domain. This individual interest
in giving reasons is, moreover, distinct from the more general interest in accuracy addressed above251:
243 Domingos, supra note 97, at 78; see also LeCun et al., supra note 33, at 436 (discussing feature selection in
algorithmic design).
244 For an instrumental argument to this effect sounding in behavioral economic terms, see Matthew J.B.
Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 IND. L.J. 1429, 1432 (2015) (“The inherent value of participating in a dispute resolution
process comes in part from its power to soothe such a grievance when it does occur, win or lose.”).
245 TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. H UO, TRUST IN THE L AW 7 (2002) (“There is considerable evidence that when
people regard the particular agents of the legal system whom they personally encounter as acting in a way they perceive to
be fair and guided by motives that they infer to be trustworthy, they are more willing to defer to their directives ....”). The
evidence for this effect has been recently challenged. See Daniel S. Nagin & Cody W. Telep, Procedural Justice and Legal
Compliance, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 5 (2017).

Stephen J. Schulhofer et. al., American Policing at A Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice
Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 345 (2011) (“Empirical research indicates that this sort of legitimacy is
sustained not by an aggressive style that subordinates individual rights but rather by something closer to its opposite-practices that can be grouped under the heading of procedural justice.”).
246

247 The seminal cases are Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); and Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).

See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908).
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Henry Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276-77 (1975) (“[I]t seems impossible at the
moment to predict at what level, if any, the Court will set the floor below which no hearing is needed.”).
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Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1213 (2013).
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See supra Part III.A.
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Its claim is not quite that the machine itself is inaccurate overall, but rather that the addition of human
review can eliminate a class of false negatives (positives) by leveraging private information held by
regulated subjects.
In my view, this is the strongest argument for a right to a human decision. The fact that state
agencies may have incentives to precipitously adopt deeply flawed machine-learning systems only adds
to its appeal. Yet without rejecting the normative concerns raised by cases such as Catherine Taylor’s,
I want to push back on the idea that that a right to a human decision is a compelling response. In
particular, I want to resist the temptation to conflate the short-term gain from human review in cases
such as Taylor’s with the question of dynamic optimality: That is, how adoption of such a right will,
in the long term, shape both desirable and undesirable outcomes, and (implicitly) whether there is
some better alternative vehicle for addressing the normative concerns.
A first, concededly tenuous, reason for hesitation is doctrinal. It is not clear that the Due
Process Clause requires a supplemental human action to ensure a sufficiently accurate machine
decisions The adjudicative forms that due process can take are often desultory.252 It is not at all obvious
that algorithmic tools cannot, outside of the specific context of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right,
supply whatever due process is constitutionally needful (unless their results are entirely orthogonal to
the quality being measured). This legal conclusion, however, arguably warrants relatively little weight.
Due process jurisprudence, after all, might simply be wrong, and in need of updating in light of
technological change.
The second reason has more heft. Installation of a human decision as a backstop to a machine
decision might have perverse and undesirable consequences for the regulated population that
outweigh any participation-related benefits.253 Rather, depending on the empirics of the situation, the
addition of a human decision may become a form of what Adam Samaha called “undue process,” that
traduces “constitutionally mandated ceilings on government process.”254 This second argument turns
on the premise that not all process is “due.” As Judge Henry Friendly observed in his canonical
reflection on the hearing requirement, every additional increment of process comes at a cost, since
“procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, [so] that at some point the
benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing
such protection.”255 Where the addition of a procedural step has the expected systemic effect of
increasing the overall frequency of error rates, or generating some other cost, there would be reason
to pause and reconsider the mandate as a matter of law and as a matter of public policy.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (mandating “some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing”
for disciplined public school students, without adding much more detail).
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Rights often have implementation-related costs that spill over to others, who are not exercising the right. For
instance, criminal procedure rights can make law enforcement more costly, and thus reduce the extent to which the state
can generate public security for all. The argument here focuses on a different possibility: that the exercise of a right has
costs that are spread across the population putatively benefiting from the right.
253

254 Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 630 (2006). Samaha was careful to acknowledge the
novelty of this possibility, and its tension with extant doctrine. I invoke his idea here not so much to suggest that there
might be a cognizable ‘undue process’ claim, but rather to press the perversity of insisting upon human involvement in
certain cases.
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Friendly, supra note 76, at 1276.
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Consider first the effect of a backstop human decision-maker for all the outputs of a machine
decision-learning process in terms of net false positives and false negative rates.256 Of course, “even
well-designed” algorithmic tools will make mistakes.257 But the addition of a human backstop to a
well-designed machine decision will not necessarily increase the overall rate of accurate judgments. As
noted, machine decisions are often less error-prone than close human substitutes.258 It is not safe to
assume that a human will be able to identify and correct all of, and only, the instances in which the
machine erred. To the contrary, there is a real possibility that human input will lead to a higher error
rate. Further, if human right is envisaged when one classification is reached, and not the other, there
is risk that the resulting errors will be unevenly distributed across the population. Absent some reason
to think the machine was itself biased, it is hard to see how a higher, asymmetrically distributed error
rate is desirable. Where an algorithmic tool is flawed, moreover, it does not follow that ex post human
review is therefore “due.” Rather, there is every reason to believe that what is “due” is a better machine
decision rather than a reliably unreliable human one. That is, even when a machine decision is flawed,
the anticipated trade-off between expected accuracy and participation trade is likely to tilt against a
human decision.
To motivate this analysis, consider a recent instance in which a non-machine algorithm was
supplemented with an ex post right of human review. Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court expanded
judges’ discretion over sentencing in federal court by rejecting the binding force of a very elementary
algorithm, the federal sentencing guidelines.259 Interjudge sentencing disparities subsequently sharply
increased, in some jurisdictions almost doubling.260 So too did racial disparities.261 Perhaps there is a
happy story to be told here about the propensity of judges to match sentences on a range of offender
characteristics beyond those contained in a presentencing report. I doubt it. To date, there is instead
every reason to think judicial discretion has had dismaying, and socially destructive, effects.262 Adding
256 This was, recall, the position of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in respect to algorithmic sentencing tools. State
v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (2016); supra text accompanying notes 79 to 82.
257

Kroll, supra note 152, at 11.
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See supra text accompanying notes 136 to 138.

259 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233, 247 (2005) (invalidating mandatory force of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-55 (2007) (appellate presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentences); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 48-49 (2007) (rejecting heightened appellate review for out-ofguidelines sentences); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007) (rejecting statutory constraints on
sentencing).

Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1333 (2014) (finding that “interjudge disparities have doubled from the period of mandatory
Guidelines sentencing to post-Booker sentencing, with a defendant potentially receiving a six-month longer sentence if
assigned by happenstance to a harsh judge”); accord Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 52-53 (2010) (similar result for a Massachusetts district court).
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261 Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL S TUD. 75,
77 (2015) (finding “significantly increased racial disparities after controlling for extensive offender and crime
characteristics” post-Booker); accord Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J. L & ECON. & ORG. 23 (2007) (similar finding).
262 I do not mean to suggest that the pre-Booker regime was without faults. Interjudge disparities derived from
inconsistent punitive preferences, however, do not appear to have been one. The mere fact of disparities, moreover, does
not alone demonstrate a flawed arrangement. Evaluating when a disparity is unwarranted “requires an idea of why we
punish.” Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1337 (1997). At least the data on racial
disparities between similar defendants raises substantial questions as to whether adequate justifications can be identified.
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human input to a (simple, non-machine) algorithm may well have done more harm than good. With
this example in hand, it is possible to see that arguments for a right to a human decision focus on a
specific person who has been wrongly denied a benefit are misleading:263 We should be concerned not
with one person’s case, but with the overall mix of wrongful human or machine decisions produced
by a system.
Now consider a variant of this argument: Rather than permitting ex post human review of all
outcomes, only instances in which the regulated subject suffers a disadvantage would trigger human
input. That is, the right would attach only to the Catherine Taylors of the world, and not to those who
are granted benefits. This asymmetry could be sharpened. The algorithm could titrate human review
as a means of limiting the latter’s costs by isolating a subset of individuals who might plausibly offer
salient, new facts that could result in a different outcome. Hence, an algorithm that generated a risk
parameter as a continuous variable will have a numerical threshold as a classification rule.264 Individuals
classified as exceeding that threshold by a small margin might be allowed to appeal. Those who cleared
the threshold by a large margin would have no right to a human decision. In short, the algorithm itself
would be designed to select a subset of negative outputs for which the addition of ex post human
review might be justified in terms of an accuracy gain. Why would a right to human review hurt in this
narrow, asymmetrical form? How, that is, could it not be due?
I remain skeptical. To begin with, this argument (for asymmetrical, and narrow-gauged ex post
human review) assumes that human review will correct false positives and only false positives. But
there is no reason to assume that only meritorious subjects of an adverse decision will appeal. ¸It is
hence possible that even narrowly calibrated human review will increase the net volume of errors by
reversing more true positives than false positives. The class of Catherine Taylors, that is, won’t all get
relief, while a class of undeserving beneficiaries who have correctly had their claims denied—call them
Elizabeth Taylors—will prevail. Lest this sound implausible, think about how selection into human
appeals will operate. There is no reason a priori to think that only and all those with relevantly
corrective private information will appeal ex post to a human. It is more plausible to think that wealth
or epistemic resources or social class will predict the tendency to appeal.265 Whether this results in
more or less errors overall is anyone’s guess. Indeed, different rates of falsification should be expected
among the Elizabeth Taylors than the Catherine Taylors. The result will be a pooling equilibrium,
rather than a separating equilibrium, in which the human decision-maker is presented with a mix of
true and false private information. It is, once again, rather fantastical to think that a human decisionmaker has a costless and frictionless mechanisms for sorting the earnest Catherines from the
Machiavellian Elizabeths. What seems from O’Neill’s threshold example to be a simple, relatively
costless step turns out on inspection, therefore, to be highly problematic and very far from
weightless.266 The empirical and technological assumptions of these optimal cases for ex post human
review are thus demanding to the point of implausibility.
263

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

264 Camelia Simon, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-Marginality in Outcome Tests for
Discrimination, 11 ANN. APP. STAT. 1193, 1194 (2017) (setting out example).
265 The original insight into the problem of signaling and the possibilities of both pooling and separating
equilibrium is to be found in Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 362-63 (1973); see also MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 238 (1994) (describing Spence's signaling game and the
resulting pooling and separating equilibria).

Technical solutions to this problem are also costly. Imagine an optimal machine decision designed to be
amenable to human interpretation. See Desai & Kroll, supra note 153, at 11 n.61. This machine produces “a tamper-evident
266
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Second, the superficial appeal of this asymmetric, narrow-gauge human review rests (perhaps
implicitly) on the assumption that there are no costs from the reversal of true positives. But this will
rarely be so. In the bail context, for instance, the reversal of a true positive may cash out as the
avoidable commission of a serious violent crime. In the welfare context, it means an undeserving
person gets a benefit that otherwise could have gone to a needy beneficiary. It is wishful thinking to
assume away the costs of reversed true positives under any system, although I suspect that the appeal
of a right to a human review trades on some suppression of these costs.
Third, it will often be the case that even the asymmetrical, narrow-gauged right to human right
will either be otiose from the start, or can be rendered irrelevance by reinforcement learning. An
individual’s opportunity to supply reasons to a human decision-maker is relevant only if those reasons
have some likelihood of influencing a process’s outcome. But for many of the decisions for which
algorithms might be employed in official hands, such as benefits eligibility or parole revocation, the
law delimits a closed set of relevant parameters. That is, the law often employs rules picking out ex
ante a fixed set of relevant facts as opposed to standards. The latter allow for more open-ended
consideration of enumerated and unanticipated factors.267 Where an algorithm is applying a legal rule
rather than a standard in this sense, it is not clear why the novel reasons or facts that an individual
subject to classification hopes to point out ex post matter. The very fact of selecting a rule rather than
a standard as the relevant law forecloses their assertion that unexpected facts are pertinent. Even when
the algorithm is designed to apply a standard (e.g., dangerousness in the bail context), it may be that
the routine application of that standard over hundreds or thousands of cases generates sub-rules based
on closed and predictable sets of parameters.268 These subrules will cover the field of possible facts
asserted as salient to a machine decision. Human review ex post will then rarely add anything of
value.269 The interaction of closed legal rules and function selection may therefore render otiose any
record that provides nonrepudiable evidence of all nodes’ actions.” Haeberlen, Kuznetsov & Druschel, supra note 153, at
175. This record could then be examined manually to ascertain whether any error had occurred, or whether the data
parameters employed in the classification rule failed to capture a particular parameter of relevance to the individual being
ranked by the classifier.
267 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-63 (1992) (defining a rule
as a legal norm given content before regulated subjects act, whereas a standard is a legal norm that is given content after
regulated subjects act).
268 Such rules-standards ‘cycling’ is observed in many legal domains. See Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The
Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346 (2016) (mapping cycles in structural constitutional law); Carol
M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 598-99 (1988) (making this observation about rules in the
property-law context); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 150 (2001) (identifying
cycling in statutory interpretation).
269 What of “the social commitment to try to understand each other” and “the potential for connection and
community”—i.e., “empathy” and “ethical development”? EUBANKS, supra note 8, at 168. Considering the state’s use of
algorithms in welfare and public benefits contexts, Eubanks argues that absent empathy, bias against minorities and women
is more possible. Id. I agree that animus is sometimes a failure of empathy. But expanding the institutional space for
human empathy is an immediate, or even medium-range, solution for failures of compassion. Absent some dramatic
improvement in the street-level quality of human judgment—and Eubanks gives no reason to think street-level officials
are overnight going to become better and more fair decision-makers--such expansions will have precisely the opposite
effect she advocates: It enables biased or motivated reasoning, and makes the ensuing distortions even harder to remedy.
By contrast, reform of machine tools allows ambient bias to be mitigated centrally. Hence, the argument that one needs
immediate human contact for better state decision-making is simply a fallacy. It is a fallacy is contradicted by some of the
twentieth-century’s great achievements of social democracy, from Britain’s National Health Service to the American Great
Society. Empathy, in short, is not enough: It must be acted upon in a strategic and thoughtful fashion, rather than used as
a crutch for superficial and ultimately unavailing responses.
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claim to a human decision (or, at a minimum, make a right to a dynamic rather than a static algorithm
more plausible).
Fourth, recall that I have so far assumed that the parameters of the training data were selected
precisely because they enable “faithful measurement” of an underlying property of interest relevant to
the prediction of the target variable.270 The participation-based argument for a human decision in
effect may assume this is not so. It assumes that the training data’s parameters are insufficient to
maximize accurate results such that ex post reason-giving has a corrective value. But if that is so, the
proper response is to improve the training data or to tweak the algorithm. Retail responses, such as a
right to an ex post human decision, perversely maintain a deficient status quo, and may even delay the
implementation of better, systemic fixes achievable through better machine decision-making.
This last point can be generalized to provide a final reason for resisting a participation-based
right to a human decision in all cases. To the extent that human review is understood as a means of
verifying the integrity of an algorithmic tool in an individual case, it is hardly clear that retail
interventions in respect to specific classification decisions is a well-fitting solution in the long term
(even if they might be a good diagnostic tool for sniffing out systemic problems). To the contrary, a
range of static oversight tools—which focus on the algorithm’s underlying source code—and dynamic
oversight tools—which look at the algorithm’s behavior in the wild – are alternatively available,271 and
over time might conduce to systematic improvements that are likely to elude a right to human review.
Given scarce resources, devoting time to individualized ex post review in lieu of more systemic testing
of an algorithm’s integrity will likely often generate the perverse effects of lower overall accuracy.
Hence, given the marginal nature of due process analysis—which focuses on the discrete positive or
negative contribution from any given increment of procedural change—ex post human review of
discrete decisions will rarely be an optimizing strategy.
*

*

*

I suspect that some readers will retain a nagging doubt as to cases such as Catherine Taylor’s
welfare denial.272 What, they might ask, can be said to the person who is erroneously ranked? To begin
with, it is worth reiterating that the mere fact of an erroneous determination does not, standing alone,
establish a legal or a moral wrong. Use of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials implies that
we are willing to tolerate a certain number of erroneous convictions. The question to ask is whether
Taylor was classified by a flawed system, and not whether in her case an error was made.
At the system level, moreover, it is far from clear that addition of a human decision-maker
would reduce the net volume of errors. Perhaps human review of both benefit grants and also denials
would generate a higher rate or errors, or a more racially skewed distribution of errors, than a machine
decision alone. And finally, to anticipate a point to which I will return in the conclusion, the flawed
quality of a machine decision does not imply that a human decision-maker would do better: Perhaps
the optimal system for all the Taylors of the world entails a better machine decision, rather than human
270 David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 653, 679 (2017).

Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 547-52 (describing static and dynamic testing protocols); see also Wachter, Mittelstadt
& Russell, supra note 155, at 13-14 (describing the use of counterfactuals to conduct tests of algorithmic integrity).
271

272

See supra text accompanying notes 17 to 18.
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review. Given the greater capacity for accuracy with machine decisions, indeed, there is every reason
to think that this condition holds—as I explore briefly in the conclusion. So nothing about my analysis
implies that some ex post verification or audits of such computational tools is unwarranted. It is, more
narrowly, to reject retail human as opposed to systemic review as a warranted intervention. But since the
right to a human decision in its GDPR Article 22 form, as well as in its less articulate variants, is best
described as a retail right that attaches to distinct individuals subject to algorithmic classification, the
continuing need for systemic review cannot supply it with a normative foundation.
C.

Classifier-Facing Grounds

I turn now to arguments for a right to a human decision that hinge on the character of state
action. The idea that an action can be impermissible as a legal or a moral matter because of the way in
which the state has behaved, rather than because of its intrusion into some protected zone of
individual interest, is familiar in American law. The Supreme Court, for instance, has recently affirmed
that individuals are entitled to bring claims alleging that official action rests on a violation of structural
constitutional principles such as federalism or the separation of powers,273 even if the same action with
the same impact on an individual’s interests could have been achieved though properly constituted
governmental action. Another version of this phenomenon arises when the state acts on the basis of
impermissible considerations, such as racial or religious identity.274 At least notionally, state action
based on impermissible grounds is unlawful even if the same action on different motivational grounds
would not be disallowed.275 In both these lines of cases, state action is deemed flawed not because of
its effects but because of the manner in which the state acted.
A classified-focused justification for the right to a human decision might home in upon one
of two arguments. First, it might be argued that a characteristic of lawful state action against individuals
is that it is reasoned. Algorithmic decisions, it might be argued, fail that minimal threshold criterion
of rationality. Second, those decisions classify individuals on the basis of group-based generalization.
As such, they fail to treat them as individuals. This latter point might be understood as a concern
about “profiling,” or it might be understood as a concern about dignity. Although both of these
arguments draw upon deep normative wellsprings, tapping anchoring intuitions in American
constitutional law, I ultimately suggest that neither provides a plausible grounding for a right to a
human decision.
1.

Reasoned State Action

The idea that state action, and in particular coercive state action, ought to be firmly grounded
on reasons is deeply entrenched in Anglo-American law. Giving reasons, on this account, is “a way of
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011) (stating that “individuals . . . are protected by the operations
of separation of powers”). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1490–514 (2013)
(doubting this claim).
273

For examples of decisions disallowing state action that would be permitted in the absence of impermissible
considerations, see, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); see also Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the use of such classifications as “pernicious” (citation omitted)).
274

For a recent exception, see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (upholding an immigration-related
executive order publicly justified on discriminatory grounds “because there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension
has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility”).
275
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showing respect for the subject, and a way of opening a conversation rather than forestalling one.”276
It “attach[es] value to the individual’s being told why the agent is treating him unfavorably and to his
having taken a part in the decision.”277 A decision, on this view, is consistent with the rule of law only
if it is “comprehensible for those subject to the decision.”278 From a midcentury liberal perspective,
state power is legitimate when based on “grounds of adequate neutrality and generality.”279 An ardent
libertarian might add that reason-giving works as a salutary friction on state action, generating
transaction costs that may be preclusive when no public-regarding ground for an action can be
articulated. Something of that intuition seems at work in the application of Fourth Amendment law
to preclude street stops on the basis of a “mere hunch.”280
Let us set aside the possibility that algorithms can be designed to issue explained decisions.281
The demand for reasoned state action still does not provide an adequate basis for a right to a human
decision for the simple reason that this is itself only occasionally and incompletely met. Many state
decisions issue absent any supporting reasoning. As Lon Fuller noted in his famous 1978 essay on
adjudication, the “integrity of adjudication” does “not necessarily” require that “reasons be given for
the decision rendered.”282 From street stops to certiorari denials, there are many discrete state
interventions within and beyond the adjudicative context that typically lack an explicit justification.
Beyond that, statutes can fashion extensive changes to social realities without offering anything by
way of adequate normative justification.283 Indeed, it is now conventional wisdom that legislatures
often enact statutory text without reaching a consensus view of the meaning of an element in the
statutory text. Ambiguous statutory text—the daily fare of appellate courts—can arise if “Congress
had no particular intent on the matter.”284 Nor is it plausible to think that all important adjudicative
actions are reasoned in a fulsome sense of that term. When a trial judge denies an evidentiary objection,
when an appellate court exercises discretion to permit a nonmandatory appeal, or the Supreme Court
denies certiorari, it is hardly clear there are articulable, let alone well-grounded, reasons for the
action.285 The sheer extent of insufficiently reasoned state action is suggestive: Taking that demand at
face value would in effect choke the modern state before it could perform any of its basic obligations.
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Mireille Hildebrandt, Algorithmic regulation and the rule of law, PHIL. TRANSACTIONS R. SOC. 1, 3 (2018)

279 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959); accord LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 34 (1964). On the putatively liberal origins of the demand for reasoned generality, see
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 78385 (1983).
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284 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516; see also ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 15-22 (2014) (describing deficits of awareness, agreement, foresight, precision drafting,
and care as typical sources of legislative ambiguity).
285 David Enoch has persuasively argued that the state’s action ought to be evaluated solely on the basis of their
foreseeable (positive or negative) consequences, rather than on their intended, or reasoned, ends. David Enoch, Intending,
Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEG. THEORY 69, 91-92 (2007) (grounding this conclusion on a comparison of individual and
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But consider a narrower version of the argument from reasoned decision-making. Perhaps
when the state engages in certain coercive actions—including the criminal justice and social welfare
decision-making that now employs algorithmic tools—it cannot act on a “mere hunch.”286 In the
narrower category of cases, officials must have sound cause for their actions. Even in these cases, the
impression that machine decisions are not, or cannot be, reasoned is a misleading and incomplete one.
For it is not the case that machine decisions are bereft of justifying grounds. It is rather that those
reasons are supplied at a point in time removed from state action impinging upon the individual. Recall
that the design, testing, and implementation of machine learning tools are all thoroughly imbricated
with purposeful human choice and intentionality.287 Human intentions guide the choice between
supervised and unsupervised models; the process of feature selections; the choice of training data; and
the ongoing process of refinement and calibration toward an optimal classifier.288 Much of this
intentional human action is necessarily oriented by an understanding of the ends that the machine will
serve. The dearth of reasoned judgments in machine decisions, therefore, is something of an optical
illusion. It is not so much that such judgments are wanting. Rather, they have already been embedded
into a classifier by the time that an algorithm is working in the world. These encoded judgments,
moreover, serve the same ends as a demand for ex post reason-giving: They function as a
precommitment to generality and as a safeguard against personalistic or arbitrary state action.289 Given
their formalized–literally calcified as code—nature, the reasons embedded in algorithms may be more
resilient to ex post manipulation than the reasons upon which judgments by courts are anchored.
In sum, even if we stand on solid ground when we demand reasoned state action—especially
when it comes to the deprivation of important human interests—our demand need not end in a right
to a human decision. To the contrary, the concerns underlying the demand might well point in the
other direction: A robustly designed algorithm thoughtfully supplied with unbiased and illuminating
training data.
2.

The Right to an Individualized Decision

A right to a human decision, alternatively, might be justified by pointing to the general
character of the grounds upon which an algorithm relies when it reaches a classification decision.
Roughly stated, the intuition here is that the state should take action against a person solely on the
basis of their own behavior or merits. It should treat them, that is, “as an individual.”290 Action based
on traits shared by a larger social group ipso facto fails to take that person seriously as an individual.
state responsibility). It may be a fair implication of his account is that the reasoned quality vel non of state action is
irrelevant.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. But see Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 25 (2007)
(defending hunches as “indispensable heuristic devices that allow people to process diffuse, complex information about
their environment and make sense of the world”).
286
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See supra text accompanying notes 174 to 194.

288 On this iterative process of algorithmic improvement, see Bengio, supra note 33, at 50-51; Amershi et al., supra
note 182, at 106
289

generality).

Cf. Schauer, supra note 276, at 651-52 (describing reason-giving as a precommitment mechanism that yields

290 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, ‘We are all Different’: Statistical Discrimination and the Right to be Treated as an Individual,
15 J. ETHICS 47, 49 (2011).
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Something like this concern with the generality of justificatory grounds is implicit in GDPR
Article 22. The latter picks out “profiling” as a form of automated processing.291 The regulation
elsewhere defines profiling broadly as “the use of personal data … to predict aspects concerning [a]
natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability, behavior, location, or movement.”292 The breadth of this definition, and its connection in
Article 22 to automated processing, imply a concern with algorithmic systems that ingest large volumes
of data in order to generate predictive classifications. The implicit distinction drawn between
automated and non-automated profiles, moreover, suggests that the GDPR’s intervention is
predicated on concern about the impersonal generality, and correlative detachment from individual
particulars, of certain machine decisions. A parallel thought can be detected in courts’ skepticism about
the use of certain kinds of statistical evidence to demonstrate the likelihood of defendant responsibility
in tort cases.293 Here there issues a call for “individualized evidence.”294 Both it and demand for a
human decision rest on a call for a particularized (rather than a population-wide) evidentiary basis for
state action.
The intuition of a right to a human decision based on a demand to be treated as an individual
can be justified by appeal to a number of philosophical traditions. It might be warranted, first, by the
Kantian notion that an individual cannot be treated as a ‘mere’ means to an end.295 The German
Constitutional Court, for example, has invoked the impermissibility of state action that “verdinglicht
und zugleich entretlicht” (“reifies and then disenfranchises”) to invalidate a provision in the 2004 Air
Transport Security Act that allowed a hijacked plane to be shot down under certain circumstances
under the German Basic Law’s commitment to human dignity.296 Alternatively, this demand might be
linked to the luck egalitarian demand that one aim to “eliminate so far as is possible the impact on
people’s lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own.”297 Because
machine decisions often rely on traits over which a person has no control, it would fall afoul of this
demand. The latter ground, however, confronts substantial difficulties given the mismatch between
291

GDPR art. 22. This Article does not prohibit profiling: It prohibits certain “decisions” based on profiling.
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GDPR art. 4(4).

293 Courts have sometimes said that merely “mathematical chances,” Smith v. Rapid Transit Inc., 317 Mass. 469,
470 (1945), or “quantitative probability,” Day v. Boston & Me. R.R., 96 Me. 207, 217 (1902), are never sufficient for the
imposition of tort liability. For a survey of different jurisdictions’ responses, see Rebecca Haw, Note, Prediction Markets and
Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1229 (2009).
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Judith Jarvis Thompson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49 L. & CONT. PROB. 199, 205 (1996)

295 I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 47 (L. Beck trans. 1959) (1st ed. Riga 1785) (“Act
so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another as, always as an end and never as a means
only.”) This Kantian notion, it should be noted, is malleable enough that it has also been put to work to justify the right
to bare participation. Edward Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, 18 NOMOS 172, 179 (1977)
(“[P]articipation is morally valuable to the degree that it makes determinate the moral principle that we should never treat
a man as a mere means.”). On the wide range of interpretations of this version of the categorical imperative, see Thomas
E. Hill, Jr., Humanity as an End in Itself, 91 ETHICS 84, 84 (1980); see also Alexander Somek, German Legal Philosophy and
Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 343, 34343 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (situating this idea in the history of German legal theory).
296 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG – Federal Constitutional Court), 59 Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift 751m
at C II b) aa) and bb) (2006).
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many criteria of social treatment and individual choice, as well as the difficulty of disentangling
unchosen traits from those over which choice has been exercised.298
At first blush, it is not at all clear why algorithmic decisions should be singled out as failing to
individuate. Algorithms can be designed to take account of “all relevant information, statistical or nonstatistical” that is “reasonably available.”299 Nor is differentiated treatment of individuals based on
their different traits and behaviors always a moral wrong. To the contrary, a uniform rule that imposes
on each an equal “share in the cost of maintaining and preserving” the common good—think of a
general draft for the military—will often be morally compelling.300 Indeed, “even good judgment” is
often predicated on nonspurious generalizations.301 Hence, the bare claim that a decision is morally
flawed because it is predicated on population-wide data rather than individualized evidence is simply
not tenable.
I think a more subtle approach is necessary to make sense of this argument. Although I am
not convinced that it yields a general objection to machine decisions, I think that with certain
assumptions and under certain conditions, it can be deployed to resist specific substitutions of
machine for human decisions. What issues is much narrower, that is, than the GDPR regime. To
motivate this more fine-grained argument, it is necessary to assume that the human decision-maker
will have access to individualized evidence, whereas the machine decision-maker would have access
only to statistical, or population-wide information. Notice that there is nothing that compels this
division of epistemic labor; a machine might be supplied with individualized evidence, while a human
decision-maker might rely on statistical evidence. The assumption, however, seems to be baked into a
right to a human decision as illuminated by the anti-“profiling” direction in GDPR Article 22.
With this assumption in hand, we can distinguish between different kinds of machine
decisions. Where the decision is a prediction, there is no obvious objection to reliance on nonindividualized evidence. If population-wide evidence is sufficient, say, to impose seatbelt mandates
for automobiles302 or vaccine regimes for school-age children,303 why should it be taken as inferior as
a basis for more granular state actions that are predictive in nature, such as bail and parole decisions?
The absolute epistemic quality of different kinds of evidence cannot be a basis for distinction.
Individualized evidence and population-wide evidence both vary in quality. There is no a priori reason
to think decisions based on one will be less accurate than decisions based on the other.304

298 Both problems are delineated in Samuel Scheffler, What is egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS 5, 17-21
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But when population-based evidence is used to substantiate a matter of historical fact for the
purpose of assigning responsibility, subtly different considerations emerge. A problem arises
particularly when the purpose of the decision is to generate a deterrence effect in the future. In a
phrase developed by the philosopher Martin Smith, there are many instances in which individualized
evidence “normically supports” the conclusion for which it is proffered,305 and hence is capable of
generating a deterrence effect. To see Smith’s point, imagine I have a laptop with a screensaver that
shows a blue screen nine-tenths of the time. While I am out at work, my friend walks past my computer
and sees a blue screen. My friend’s belief that the screen is blue is “normically supported” by her
perception; my analog belief that the screen was blue is not.306 This can be stated in another way. My
friend’s belief that the screen is blue is counterfactually sensitive to the truth whereas my evidence is not.307
If we learn later that the screen was not blue at that moment, I might simply shrug about my unlucky
guess. For my friend, such indifference would seem “out of place.”308 She should, perhaps, have her
vision checked for colorblindness.
This distinction can be transposed to the legal context in the following way. If employed as a
basis for adverse action, my friend’s evidence is sensitive to historical facts in a way my evidence is
not. This suggests that whereas both kinds of evidence can be rationally employed to form beliefs and
predictions, only counterfactually sensitive evidence can be used to generate a deterrence effect.309
Where liability is imposed on the basis of insensitive grounds (i.e., statistical evidence), it will not deter.
Hence, sensitivity matters for deterrence, even if it does not matter for prediction or perhaps
knowledge.310 When a machine decision relies on population-wide evidence, therefore, there is a loss
of deterrence effect.
So it may be that the objection to the use of non-individualized evidence comes down to a
demand for optimal deterrence, and also perhaps to our social practices of blaming.311 But if evidence
that is not individualized improves accuracy, while failing to create desirable incentives, why should
that be the basis of an individual’s objection? It is the state, not the regulated individual, who has the
interest in deterrence. Moreover, recall that this line of argument is also premised on the (probably
flawed) assumption that machines only rely on population-wide evidence, whereas human
decisionmakers always have access to individualized evidence. This line of argument, finally, is not
enough to explain a general right to a human decision given the manner in which algorithmic decisions
are presently employed. Most of the present uses of machine learning by the state involve predictions,
rather than findings of historical fact upon which deterrence is based.312 Not all concern blame, and if
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the allocation of blame is viewed as the central function of a decision tool, then machines may be just
as inapt as for causal questions. For all these reasons, I am skeptical that a concern with counterfactual
sensitivity can redeem the right to a human decision.
*

*

*

The classifier-facing grounds for a right to a human decision, in short, fare no better than
arguments that begin with individuals’ rights. Neither a worry about reasoned state action nor a
concern with the individuated character of evidence upon which state action rests proves satisfying.
D.

Systemic Concerns

A final potential ground upon which the right to a human decision might be defended dilates
the analytic lens beyond the immediate transaction between an individual and a machine to consider
the dynamic consequences of exclusive reliance on machine decisions on wider patterns of state action.
Although a greater number of human decision may have desirable systemic consequences—discussed
below—these could only with difficulty be used to sustain a free-standing individual right. Rather, all
these interests might more precisely be targeted and advanced through alternative interventions that
do not rely on the happenstance of individuals exercising discretion over whether, or if, to press their
legal interests. While the system concerns identified here might thus provide collateral support for the
right at issue, they cannot plausibly work as its principal buttresses.
First, the enforcement of legal rights against state actors is commonly associated with
“decreased activity levels” close to judicially enforced threshold of liability.313 A right to a human
decision would be no different. Exclusive reliance on machine decisions lowers the marginal cost of
exercising a given state power. The right can hence be thought of as a kind of enervating friction on
state action. But of course, whether this is desirable will obviously depend on the nature of the activity.
For example, consider the possibility of fully automating unmanned drone plans capable of exercising
deadly force on a distant battlefield.314 Even to sympathetic eyes, a thorough excision of the human
role in warfare raises complex ethical issues.315 One of these might focus on the effect of maintaining
a human role on activity levels. If it were the case that maintaining a human role led to a lower activity
level, without preclusive costs to a war effort, one might plausibly speak of an obligation to maintain
a human in the loop as a way to forestall the rapid inflation of lethal drone use.
Second, several commentators have worried about “automation bias,” or the “use of
automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing.”316 In effect,
humans adopt a heuristic of reliance upon automated decisions “as a replacement for more vigilant
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liability rule is disputed. Conventional wisdom holds that both negligence and strict liability regimes are associated with a
risk of excessive activity. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 66-71 (1987).
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system monitoring or decision making.”317 The right to a human decision works as a prophylactic
against the possibility that humans will place excessive faith in machine decisions because of the veneer
of expertise and objectivity that infuses that technology.318 However forceful this concern may be—
empirical evidence is thin on the ground—there are likely a number of ways to ensure against
complacent reliance on automated decisionmakers—not least some kind of frequent auditing.
Reliance on the individuals subject to classification may be one of a range of solutions, but it is hardly
an inevitable design choice.
A third argument for a right to a human decision focuses on the effects of machine decisions
on the distribution of social power. Machine learning allows for gains to social welfare as a result of
new or more accurate predictions. But these gains might be unevenly distributed in ways that trigger
deep normative concern. Because machine-learning tools requires large pools of data and robust
computational resources, it is likely that they will be adopted and used by organizational entities, not
least the state, that already have asymmetrical relationships with the public at large. Adoption of
machine learning might exacerbate these imbalances in undesirable ways. This raises the possibility
that unease concerning machine decisions rests not on their distinctive quality, but on their effects
upon the relationship between the state and its subjects, or large corporations and individual market
participants. Asymmetrical distributions of such power might undermine the possibility conditions of
participatory democracy, if machine decisions are used to shape political preferences. Alternatively,
they might enable new, highly intrusive forms of regulation consistent with some normatively wellgrounded account of individual liberty.
I am sympathetic to these concerns. But I am skeptical that an individual right provides a
meaningful response given the technological realities and normative implications mapped in Parts II
and earlier in this Part. A right to a human decision is a response to technologies that generate
troublesome asymmetries between persons and concentrated organizational power. The problem is
that it requires heroic assumptions to conclude that dispersed individuals—vulnerable to state or
corporate pressure along multiple margins—will be capable of using a right to engage in collective
action that effectually redresses asymmetrical social arrangements. That is, the mere provision of rights
does not resolve the asymmetry of power. This much is evident from a half-century of experience
with procedural entitlements in the criminal justice context, which suggests that rights’ efficacy is
tightly constrained by the ability of the state (or similarly regulated actor) to find substitute vectors of
influence.319 Recent experience with individual entitlements to privacy in the social media and internet
platform contexts also furnishes cause for pessimism.320 A central problem with consent-based privacy
regimes is that consumers seem to place different values on that good depending on whether they
were asked to consider how much money they would accept to disclose otherwise private information
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or how much they would pay to protect otherwise public information.321 They also appear to have
time-inconsistent preferences, in the sense that they are willing to accept low rewards now in exchange
for a “possibility permanent negative annuity in the future.”322 Rights, in short, often (although not
always) fall short of catalyzing reallocations of power.
If rights are not necessarily the best instruments to challenge concentrated social power, at
least when conceptualized as a stand-alone instrument, is there an alternative? A more direct approach
entails a frontal attack on asymmetries of power or influence by fragmenting the extant concentrations
of social power.323 One might also think of ways to redistribute the surplus that results from aggregated
epistemic authority. But absent evidence that the right to a human decision can facilitate this sort of
mobilization—and I don’t think such evidence exists—we should not precipitously conclude that an
individual right provides an effectual solution to a structural and systemic dysfunction.
Finally, and related to the concern about power, a human decision may be preferred to a
human decision in order to pursue an institutional design goal such as the diffusion of state authority
or the continued evolution of legal rules. In effect, the claim would be that human decisional authority
has certain positive spillovers beyond the individual case. An argument of this kind might justify
localized substitution of human for machine decision-making. But it would not provide a global reason
for such substitution. Indeed, even its local application would hinge on other elements of institutional
design.
A human decision might be preferred, for example, because it maintains the open-endedness
of legal criterion, or because it injected an element of uncertainty into law’s implementation. A
supervised machine learning tool’s goals must be fully specified in order to be implemented. A resort
to human decision-making allows for an under-specification of those ends. Seemingly problematic
from the perspective of legality, such under-specification of law’s ends might be desirable under
certain circumstances. It might, for example, allow law’s dynamic updating over time. It might also
constitute a limitation on the authority of law-makers to fully define law by preserving a redoubt of
free-wheeling discretionary judgment by a back-end human decision-maker. An institutional perch for
revision and second-guessing of authority has a particular attraction as an element of a liberal
constitutional democracy. Of course, there is no reason why the institutionalization of corrigibility
needs to take the form of a human decision. It is also possible to imagine a similar goal being pursued
through a public system of audits focusing on the systemic operation of the algorithm. Something of
the kind can also be installed elsewhere in a political system, rendering a right to a human decision
nugatory. Alternatively, a specific machine decision tool might be rejected on the ground that it will
impede the dynamic development of new legal rules. A machine learning tool, that is, might refine its
classification rule through reinforcement learning over time, but this will not necessarily yield detailed
new legal guidance for primary conduct. Again, this argument for human decision-making is
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contingent on the absence of other platforms for refinement and publication of new, more detailed
rules for primary conduct.
None of these systemic concerns, in short, is sufficient to motivate a freestanding individual
right. At best, a human decision in lieu of a machine decision is a useful, although not essential
instrument of institutional design for the production of positive spillovers. Whether that substitution
is desirable, in short, will depend on other elements of institutional design. It is poorly described as a
‘right.’
E.

The ‘Right’ to a Human Decision Dubitante

Fully automated decision-making provokes unease in many minds.324 And a taxonomy of the
potential justifications for a right to a human decision reveals a range of variegated normative
considerations. Some can be loosely ranked under the labels ‘autonomy’ and ‘dignity.’ Some concern
the opportunity to proffer reasons, while others turn on the reasoned nature of state action. Yet others
concern the balance of power between individuals and either the state or corporate actors. Careful
analysis of all of these reasons, however, suggests that none can justify a right to a human decision. In
some instances, such as the right to bare participation, the absence of any recognition of an analog
right in cognate fields of law seems preclusive. In other instances, including the interest in proffering
reasons and in receiving a reasoned decision, the argument for the right is predicated on doctrinal and
technological circumstances that will only occasionally, and only by happenstance, be satisfied. As a
result, the right to individualized consideration is more ephemeral than appears at first blush; to the
extent that it stands on firm normative ground, it probably does not apply to most practical state
applications of machine-learning technology.
There are many reasons to be cautious about the avulsive advance of new algorithmic
technologies, ranging from their effects on the labor market to their propagation of historical bias and
reinforcement of social stratification. Normative and legal concern, however, should not be directed
at the articulation or enforcement of a right to a human decision akin to that found in GDPR art. 22.
At least for now, it may well be a game that is simply not worth the candle.
Conclusion: A Right to a Well-Calibrated Machine Decision?
The aim of this paper has been to explore potential justifications for a right to a human
decision. Based on that survey of the normative and technological terrain, I have rejected that right as
an attractive general amendment to the law. Although I cannot rule out the desirability of such a right
as applied to the state (the main object of my analysis) in all circumstances, my analysis undermines
the plausibility of the right to a human decision wrought as a general, across-the-board regime.
In concluding, let me offer what I hope is a provocative, albeit tentative, thought: Rather than
thinking about a right to a human decision, might we be better off limning a right to a well-calibrated
machine decision? Glimpses of such a right’s foundations can be caught, scattered across the previous
analysis: I can only gather them here briefly as a way of stimulating reflection on the possibility.
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An account of the right to a machine decision would begin with the observation that under
most likely conditions, a well-designed machine-learning tools is both more accurate and less likely to
discriminate on invidious grounds than human decision-makers. But many of the algorithmic
instruments now implemented by government are highly flawed.325 Yet this does not impel a reversion
to equally flawed human decision-making. Rather, legal rules should incentivize the correction of such
errors. Its dynamic goal should be a better machine decision. To the extent that Due Process interests
are justified by the interest in an accurate decisional process, they arguably point in favor of more and
better, not less or worse, automation. Human supplements, indeed, might be a form of baleful “undue
process,”326 which induces a sense of psychological comfort at the price of an increase in false positives
and negatives. Provided that an algorithmic tool is well-calibrated in the sense of not relying on flawed
training data, and not employing a predictive tool that reinforces pernicious forms of stratification,
that tool may well perform better than a human being. Hence, a better right to formulate into law
would entitle individuals to a robustly designed algorithm aimed at a legitimate goal, which is supplied
with unbiased and illuminating training data, and then effectively monitored to prevent unwarranted
results from emerging.327
It is also possible that well-calibrated machine decision-makers will have underappreciated
advantages that sound in dignitary and autonomy terms. Consider the possibility of dignitary gains
from such a right. Algorithmic therapists such as ‘Woebot,’ for example, now interact with between
one to two million people online; apart from being free, the algorithmic tool is “easier to talk to”
because users “don’t feel judged.”328 The same point might be made by pointing to dating algorithms,
which occupy an increasing share of the matchmaking market and which squeeze out family and
friends as intermediaries; depersonalization might facilitate new possibilities and avoid certain forms
of humiliation.329 It is quite possible that an algorithmic interface for welfare recipients –who are a
notoriously stigmatized group330—might also reduce the psychological costs attendant on those
benefits. These examples are intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive. But they point to ways
in which new technologies, strategically deployed, might mitigate inequality and enable humanity—
rather than the reverse.
In sum, algorithmic technologies used by machine decisions are still in their infancy. And they
can be flawed in many ways. It seems too early, however, to assume that human decisions will be
globally superior to machine decisions such that a right to the former is warranted. Sometimes the
opposite might be true. We should, therefore, at least consider the possibility that under certain
circumstances a right to a well-calibrated machine decision might be the better option.
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